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BANKRUPTCY’S CORPORATE  
TAX LOOPHOLE 
Diane Lourdes Dick* 
 
Imagine you are a company with a failing business that is drowning in 
debt.  On the bright side, you also possess a very valuable asset.  This asset 
is unique because, unlike most assets, if you liquidate the business through 
a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, it will be extinguished and its value will not be 
realized by any shareholders or creditors.  On the other hand, even if you 
substantially liquidate the business using Chapter 11, you can, thanks to an 
extraordinary ambiguity in the law, preserve this valuable asset.  Even 
better, you can direct the value of this asset to your preferred 
stakeholders—whether they are shareholders or creditors—rather than 
have the asset’s value allocated among stakeholders according to 
bankruptcy’s absolute priority rule.  You can do this because you have the 
most information about this valuable asset and because bankruptcy law and 
courts effectively ignore its existence, leaving you to allocate its value as 
you see fit.  What is this unique asset?  Valuable tax attributes, including 
net operating losses and credit carryovers.  This scenario is not purely 
hypothetical; Solyndra and Washington Mutual, among others, have 
effectively used Chapter 11 to divert the value of tax losses and credits to a 
select group of shareholders and creditors in contravention of bankruptcy’s 
distributional norms.  This Article recommends statutory revisions to the 
tax and bankruptcy laws to remove the unintended tax advantage and thus 
neutralize the tax consequences of corporate restructuring decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In September 2011, the financially troubled solar cell manufacturing 
company Solyndra LLC and its parent, 360 Degree Solar Holdings, Inc., 
filed voluntary petitions for bankruptcy protection in U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Delaware.1  By generally accepted financial and 
accounting conventions, Solyndra2 was insolvent.3  In preliminary 
disclosures made to the court, the privately held company reported assets of 
$854 million and liabilities of $863 million.4 
Solyndra’s difficulties were not merely financial.  By most accounts, the 
company failed because of fundamental deficiencies in its business model.5  
The company produced solar panels made from innovative materials that 
became increasingly difficult to market as commodity price shifts and 
 
 1. Voluntary Petition, In re Solyndra LLC, No. 11-21799 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 6, 
2011); Voluntary Petition, 360 Degree Solar Holdings, Inc., In re Solyndra, No. 11-21799. 
 2. Unless the context indicates otherwise, “Solyndra” refers to Solyndra LLC and 360 
Degree Solar Holdings, Inc., together. 
 3. Under bankruptcy law, a company is insolvent when “the sum of such entity’s debts 
is greater than all of such entity’s property, at a fair valuation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) 
(2012). 
 4. Schedules of Assets & Liabilities of Solyndra LLC (Second Amended) at 1, In re 
Solyndra, No. 11-21799 (Feb. 14, 2012). 
 5. See, e.g., Yulia Chernova, Loan Was Solyndra’s Undoing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 
2011, at B1. 
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governmental subsidies drove down the cost of competitor products.6  
Additionally, Solyndra became embroiled in political controversy and fraud 
accusations arising out of the U.S. Department of Energy’s guarantee of a 
$535 million loan to the company.7  The morning after the company filed 
for bankruptcy, the FBI raided the company’s facilities in search of 
documents and electronic files that might evidence any wrongdoing in the 
company’s dealings with the Department of Energy.8 
According to conventional wisdom, companies that suffer financial 
difficulties may be resuscitated via debt restructuring, while companies that 
also struggle with deeper economic problems, such as outmoded business 
models, should be liquidated.9  But despite falling into the latter category, 
Solyndra did not pursue liquidation under Chapter 710 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code.11  Instead, Solyndra filed under Chapter 11,12 which is 
often cited as a source of rehabilitative relief, enabling debtors to reorganize 
and emerge from bankruptcy with a fresh start.13 
Were Solyndra’s stakeholders overly sanguine about the company’s 
long-term prospects and drawn to Chapter 11 as the “optimist’s valhalla”?14  
Probably not.  Although Chapter 11 is more commonly associated with its 
rehabilitative relief mechanisms, it also offers tools to liquidate a 
business.15  And in Solyndra’s case, it seems that from the outset, the 
company’s insiders intended to use Chapter 11’s liquidation mechanisms 
rather than its rehabilitative devices.16  Almost immediately after filing for 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Eric Morath, Lawmaker Seeks Solyndra Examiner, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2011, at 
A2. 
 8. Thomas Catan & Deborah Solomon, FBI Raids Solar-Panel Maker, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 9, 2011, at B1. 
 9. See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 
11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1050–51 (1992). 
 10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784 (2012) (providing for liquidations of bankrupt persons). 
 11. All references herein to the Bankruptcy Code are to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.). 
 12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174 (providing for reorganizations and liquidations of bankrupt 
persons). 
 13. This purpose of Chapter 11 was articulated at the time of its adoption in 1978:  
“Chapter 11 deals with the reorganization of a financially distressed business enterprise, 
providing for its rehabilitation by adjustment of its debt obligations and equity interests.” S. 
REP. NO. 95-989, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5795.  “The purpose of 
a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a business’s 
finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, 
and produce a return for its stockholders.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179. 
 14. In re Maxim Indus., Inc., 22 B.R. 611, 613 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985). 
 15. Liquidation can be accomplished by selling all or substantially all of the company’s 
assets in a sale conducted during the pendency of the case or pursuant to a confirmed 
Chapter 11 plan.  Asset sales may be conducted under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1), which provides 
that, in the course of a Chapter 11 case, a debtor in possession, “after notice and a hearing, 
may . . . sell . . . other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . .”  
Moreover, 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) permits the sale of all of the property of the estate and the 
distribution of the proceeds to creditors pursuant to a liquidation plan. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1123(b)(4). 
 16. See infra notes 17–18. 
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bankruptcy, the company sought approval to sell substantially all of its 
assets.17  In pleadings before the court, stakeholders argued the classic 
economic case for liquidation:  that the company’s assets were worth more 
either in the hands of a higher-valuing end user or in an alternative use.18 
Solyndra’s pursuit of liquidation under Chapter 11 is not exceptional.  As 
other commentators observe, business debtors increasingly conduct 
liquidations under Chapter 11 rather than Chapter 7.19  For one thing, 
Chapter 11 allows a debtor’s incumbent management team to command the 
liquidation process,20 whereas Chapter 7 requires management to relinquish 
control to a trustee.21  Similarly, some bankruptcy scholars reason that 
Chapter 11 liquidations are faster and less expensive and may generate 
higher payouts to creditors.22 
But Solyndra’s case differs from the typical Chapter 11 liquidation23 in a 
very important respect.  Although Solyndra also sold substantially all of its 
assets during the pendency of its Chapter 11 case, it pursued a vaguely 
styled “Joint Chapter 11 Plan” (the Solyndra Plan),24 claiming to effectuate 
both a reorganization and a liquidation.25  In particular, the Solyndra Plan 
contemplated that the parent would be reorganized and would continue to 
exist, while the operating subsidiary would be dissolved.26  Following a 
 
 17. Motion of Solyndra LLC Pursuant to Sections 105(a) and 363 of the Bankruptcy 
Code for Authority to (A) Conduct an Auction for Core Assets, and (B) Sell Assets to the 
Successful Bidders at an Auction Free and Clear of all Encumbrances at 1, In re Solyndra 
LLC, No. 11-12799 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 22, 2011). 
 18. Id. at 17.  Solyndra’s stakeholders sought to sell the company’s assets to a turnkey 
buyer. Id. at 3.  However, they also solicited court approval to sell the assets separately if 
necessary. Id. at 17. 
 19. See, e.g., H. Jason Gold & Dylan G. Trache, Liquidation of Troubled Businesses:  
Chapter 11 Liquidations Increasing, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2009, at 10; 
Michael Cooley, How To Succeed at Chapter 11 Without Really Reorganizing, J. CORP. 
RENEWAL (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?
objectID=9654. 
 20. The debtor in possession “generally has the authority to exercise the same powers as 
a trustee.” Weingarten Nostat, Inc. v. Serv. Merch. Co., 396 F.3d 737, 742 n.4 (6th Cir. 
2005) (discussing and citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1108). 
 21. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–702. 
 22. See, e.g., Arturo Bris et al., The Costs of Bankruptcy:  Chapter 7 Liquidation Versus 
Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253, 1301 (2006); Stephen J. Lubben, Business 
Liquidation, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 81 (2007); see also 9C AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 2818 
(2006); BEN BRANCH ET AL., LAST RIGHTS:  LIQUIDATING A COMPANY (2007).  Not all 
bankruptcy scholars, however, agree that Chapter 11 offers a more efficient method of 
achieving any outcome. See generally Diane Lourdes Dick, The Chapter 11 Efficiency 
Fallacy, 2013 BYU L. REV. 759 (highlighting Chapter 11’s inherent structural 
inefficiencies). 
 23. Consider, for instance, the recent Chapter 11 liquidation of the beleaguered 
bookseller Borders.  The debtor in possession proposed and sought court approval of a 
“Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidation,” which contemplated that the debtor would sell its assets 
and then dissolve. See First Amended Joint Plan of Liquidation Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code Proposed by the Debtors and the Official Committee of Unsecured 
Creditors at 15, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 11-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2011). 
 24. Debtors’ Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan at 1, In re Solyndra LLC, No. 11-12799 
(Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 7, 2012). 
 25. Id. at sec. I. 
 26. Id. 
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series of sales to liquidate the assets of the subsidiary,27 the parent bore 
little resemblance to its previous incarnation as the holding company to a 
solar cell manufacturer.  With no operating subsidiary, no manufacturing 
assets, no significant employee base and no active business,28 the 
“reorganized” parent was arguably a mere shell.  The Solyndra Plan’s 
preservation of the parent was especially perplexing given that the company 
adopted a parent-subsidiary structure just seven months prior to the 
bankruptcy filing.29 
In terms of economic substance, the Solyndra Plan clearly contemplated 
liquidation of Solyndra’s historic business enterprise of manufacturing solar 
panels.  But in terms of legal form, the Solyndra Plan also devised a 
reorganization of the parent.  The company’s shareholders, led by two 
private equity firms,30 exploited the disconnect between substance and form 
to extract a noteworthy economic privilege:  the future ability to use nearly 
$1 billion of Solyndra’s tax losses and credits.31  These valuable tax 
attributes came to rest on the books of the corporate parent because the 
operating subsidiary was an unincorporated flow-through entity with only 
one corporate member, and therefore disregarded for tax purposes.32  While 
not disclosed as assets at the time of the company’s bankruptcy filing,33 
these losses and credits have substantial value because they can be used to 
reduce federal income tax liabilities on future earnings.34 
 
 27. See Michael Kanellos, Failed Solar Company’s Auction Draws Bargain Hunters, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2011, at B1; Michael Bathon, Solyndra Wins Court Approval To Sell 
Manufacturing Plant, BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 24, 2012, 1:05 PM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2012-09-24/solyndra-wins-court-approval-of-manufacturing-facility-auction.html. 
 28. The company terminated operations and laid off virtually all of its employees prior 
to its bankruptcy filing. Declaration of W.G. Stover, Jr., Senior Vice President and Chief 
Financial Officer, in Support of First Day Motions at 13, In re Solyndra, No. 11-12799 
(Sept. 6, 2011). 
 29. Stakeholders reorganized the company in February 2011. Id. at 6–11. 
 30. See Solyndra, Inc., Amendment 1 to Form S-1 (Form S-1), at 2, 98 (Mar. 16, 2010) 
(noting that Argonaut Ventures I, LLC, and its affiliates (Argonaut) beneficially owned 
approximately 35.7 percent of the company’s outstanding common stock, and Madrone 
Partners, L.P., (Madrone) beneficially owned 11 percent of the company’s outstanding 
common stock).  The remaining investors were other equity funds, officers, and directors of 
the company. See id.  However, pursuant to the February 2011 restructuring, the company 
issued equity warrants that would revert ownership of 99.9 percent of the company’s 
outstanding common stock to Argonaut and Madrone. See The Solyndra Memorial Tax 
Break, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000
872396390444799904578050803545600588; see also Solyndra, Inc., Notice of Exempt 
Offering of Securities (Form D) (Mar. 10, 2011). 
 31. See Michael Bathon, Solyndra Lenders Ahead of Government Won’t Recover Fully, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 17, 2012, 5:53 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-
17/solyndra-lenders-ahead-of-government-won-t-recover-fully.html. 
 32. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (2006). 
 33. The tax attributes are not disclosed on the company’s schedules of assets and 
liabilities filed with the court. See Schedules of Assets & Liabilities 360 Degree Solar 
Holdings (Amended), In re Solyndra LLC, No. 11-12799 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 19, 2012); 
Schedules of Assets & Liabilities Solyndra LLC (Second Amended), In re Solyndra, No. 11-
12799 (Feb. 7, 2012). 
 34. See infra Part I.B. 
2278 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
Because Solyndra’s parent emerged from bankruptcy with no active 
business, its managers immediately set out to raise capital and conduct 
acquisitions of profitable businesses to realize the tax benefits.  Once 
utilized, these tax attributes may generate up to $350 million of federal 
income tax savings35 for any investments “stuffed” into the parent, thereby 
enhancing the company’s cash position and giving shareholders a sizable 
investment advantage.36  To place these amounts in perspective, Solyndra’s 
unsecured creditors—including the Department of Energy—received 
approximately $3.8 million under the Solyndra Plan:  an estimated three 
cents on the dollar for their claims.37 
With the exception of rules that apply to consolidated enterprises,38 the 
tax laws generally39 do not allow a corporation taxed under Subchapter C40 
to transfer its tax attributes to another person, whether in bankruptcy or 
otherwise.41  Thus, in order to retain the future ability to use its valuable tax 
attributes, a debtor company must emerge from bankruptcy intact.  Of 
course, Solyndra would not have been able to exit bankruptcy if it had been 
liquidated under Chapter 7.42  Congress specifically prohibits the continued 
existence of business entities following bankruptcy liquidation in an effort 
to prevent “trafficking in corporate shells.”43  For the same reasons, 
Solyndra’s stakeholders would not have retained the company’s tax 
attributes if they pursued a pure plan of liquidation in Chapter 11.44  In both 
 
 35. These figures assume a 35 percent federal income tax rate on corporate income.  The 
corporate income tax is imposed pursuant to I.R.C. § 11(B)(1)(D), based upon the statutory 
rates set forth in that section. 
 36. See The Solyndra Memorial Tax Break, supra note 30. 
 37. See Debtors’ Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 24, at 18, 38. 
 38. Under I.R.C. § 1501, an affiliated group of corporations may file a consolidated 
return. Consolidated enterprises are subject to extensive regulations promulgated under 
§ 1501. See I.R.C. § 1501 (2012). 
 39. There are, of course, some highly specific exceptions. See, e.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr. 
& Alan J. Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor 
Leasing, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1768 (1982) (providing an early critique of the continuing 
practice of “safe harbor leasing,” whereby taxpayers lease the tax benefits of ownership of 
an asset to another party who can use them).  Similarly, to the extent we think of tradable 
pollution credits as tax attributes, then these would also exemplify a departure from the 
general rule. See Richard F. Kosobud et al., Tradable Environmental Pollution Credits:  A 
New Financial Asset, 1 REV. ACCT. & FIN. 69 (2002). 
 40. Unless the context indicates otherwise, the term “corporation” refers to entities taxed 
under Subchapter C of the Tax Code and not to corporations governed by Subchapter S of 
the Tax Code.  The former are taxpaying entities while the latter are generally treated as 
“pass through” entities, with shareholders responsible for paying taxes on income. See 
sources cited infra note 149. 
 41. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 42. Unlike individual debtors, business debtors are not entitled to discharge debts in a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1).  Instead, Chapter 7 debtors must distribute all 
property in full or partial satisfaction of claims against the estate. Id. § 726.  Debtors who are 
not individuals are then dissolved. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 43. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 384–85 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 98–99 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787. 
 44. Chapter 11 liquidating plans typically contemplate that the debtor will sell its assets 
and remit the proceeds to a liquidating trust.  Under federal income tax regulations, 
liquidating trusts are permitted to exist solely for the purpose of satisfying claims and 
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cases, any excess tax benefits would have expired with the then defunct 
parent and subsidiary entities.45 
Although Chapter 11 offered Solyndra’s stakeholders the best 
opportunity to keep the company intact and therefore preserve its valuable 
tax attributes, Chapter 11 carries its own restrictions.  Most notably, debtors 
are not permitted to discharge debts and exit bankruptcy pursuant to a plan 
that essentially achieves liquidation rather than reorganization.46  For these 
reasons, Chapter 11 bankruptcy only became economically attractive to 
Solyndra following its February 2011 adoption of a parent-subsidiary 
structure.  Then, the company could enter Chapter 11 as two separate 
debtors and creatively sidestep these confirmation requirements. 
Predictably, the evidence presented by the Solyndra Plan’s opponents 
strongly suggests that the company’s path through Chapter 11 was tax 
driven.  The Solyndra Plan was designed to take advantage of an ambiguity 
in the law that allows a company to liquidate its business under Chapter 11 
and preserve valuable tax attributes for future use by reorganizing only the 
corporate parent.47  Solyndra has not been the only company to employ this 
strategy in recent years.  Among others,48 Washington Mutual followed a 
similar path through Chapter 11, liquidating its business assets and 
reorganizing the parent to preserve nearly $18 billion in valuable tax 
attributes.49 
Nonetheless, the bankruptcy court endorsed the Solyndra Plan in October 
201250 over the objections of the Internal Revenue Service51 (IRS) and the 
 
otherwise effectuating the plan of liquidation. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(d) (as amended in 
1997). 
 45. See supra notes 43–44. 
 46. Section 1141(d)(3) expressly proscribes the granting of a discharge if “(A) the plan 
provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the property of the estate; (B) the 
debtor does not engage in business after consummation of the plan; and (C) the debtor would 
be denied a discharge . . . if the case were a case under chapter 7.” See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1141(d)(3); Borsdorf v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp. (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 128 B.R. 
976, 982 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (describing the purpose of this provision).  What is more, 
a Chapter 11 plan may not be confirmed unless it complies with the provisions of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(a).  A plan must be feasible, demonstrating that the debtor will generate profits from 
future business operations. See Fin. Sec. Assurance v. T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’Ship (In re 
T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship), 116 F.3d 790, 801–02 (5th Cir. 1997).  The proponent of a 
Chapter 11 plan bears the burden of proof with respect to each element of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(a). See In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591, 610 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001). 
 47. See sources cited infra notes 51–52. 
 48. See Order Confirming First Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re PMI Grp., Inc., 
No. 11-13730 (Bankr. D. Del. July 25, 2013), ECF No. 1015 (confirming a Chapter 11 plan 
pursuant to which a corporate parent reorganized to preserve valuable tax attributes). 
 49. Peg Brickley & Mike Spector, WaMu Gets Closer to Bankruptcy Exit, WALL ST. J. 
(May 25, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303654
804576343803438618670.  The tax attributes are discussed in greater detail in In re Wash. 
Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. 200, 225–26 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), vacated in part, No. 08-12229 
(MFW), 2012 WL 1563880 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24, 2012). 
 50. Order Confirming Debtors’ Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan, In re Solyndra LLC, 
No. 11-12799 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 22, 2012). 
 51. Objection of the United States of America, on Behalf of the IRS, to Confirmation of 
Debtors’ Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan, In re Solyndra, No. 11-12799 (Oct. 10, 2012). 
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U.S. Trustee.52  The government argued that the principal purpose of the 
Solyndra Plan was tax avoidance, as evidenced by the fact that the parent 
would emerge from bankruptcy with valuable tax attributes and no active 
business.53  In approving the Solyndra Plan, the court reasoned that the 
parent’s business purpose was merely to serve as a holding company and 
that the valuable tax attributes would motivate the parent to continue its 
historical line of business of investing in companies.54 
Yet this “pseudo-reorganization” tax avoidance strategy, as I call it in this 
Article, arguably cannot withstand a closer reading of tax and commercial 
law.55  But it would miss the mark to focus only on the dubious merits of 
this particular deal structure.  The pseudo-reorganization is just one of 
many recent and high-profile attempts to circumvent Chapter 11’s 
distributional norms by exploiting ambiguity in the corporate tax and 
bankruptcy laws.  Thus, whether one agrees or disagrees with the Solyndra 
court’s reasoning, the case invites one to explore the relatively uncharted 
junction between these two areas of the law,56 and to give deeper theoretical 
consideration to various provisions of the U.S. Tax Code57 that benefit 
bankrupt companies. 
A central claim of this Article is that bankruptcy-specific exceptions in 
the tax laws transform the debtor’s valuable tax attributes into marketable 
property that, in many cases, gives the estate its intrinsic value.  Yet the 
bankruptcy laws leave these tax assets vulnerable to siphoning by dominant 
stakeholders who are in a position to extract excess returns.58  The problem 
arises because one of the Bankruptcy Code’s most important safeguards 
instructs courts to evaluate the fairness of nonconsensual Chapter 11 plans 
against a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.59  But because under the tax 
 
 52. U.S. Trustee’s Objection to Confirmation of the Debtors’ Amended Joint Chapter 11 
Plan, In re Solyndra, No. 11-12799 (Oct. 10, 2012). 
 53. See id. at 5–6. 
 54. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  A similar decision was more recently 
rendered in the PMI Group, Inc.’s Chapter 11 case. See Order Confirming First Amended 
Plan of Reorganization at 10, In re PMI Grp., Inc., No. 11-13730 (Bankr. D. Del. Jul. 25, 
2013), ECF No. 1015. 
 55. See infra Part III.C. 
 56. There is a relative dearth of legal scholarship at the confluence of tax and 
bankruptcy.  There are, however, some recent exceptions. See, e.g., Michelle Arnopol Cecil, 
Abandonments in Bankruptcy:  Unifying Competing Tax and Bankruptcy Policies, 88 MINN. 
L. REV. 723 (2004); Frances R. Hill, Toward a Theory of Bankruptcy Tax:  A Statutory 
Coordination Approach, 50 TAX LAW. 103 (1996); Shu-Yi Oei, Taxing Bankrupts, 55 B.C. 
L. REV. 375 (2014); Katherine Pratt, Shifting Biases:  Troubled Company Debt 
Restructurings After the 1993 Tax Act, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 23 (1994); Jack F. Williams, 
Bifurcation for Claim Filing Purposes of a Corporate Tax Year That Straddles the Petition 
Date, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463 (2001). 
 57. All references herein to the Tax Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.). 
 58. Such excess returns are the very essence of economic rents. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & 
JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:  THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 62 (2004) (referring to economic rents as “extra returns that firms or 
individuals obtain due to their positional advantages”).  See generally GORDON TULLOCK, 
THE RENT SEEKING SOCIETY (2005).  
 59. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2012). 
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laws, the debtor’s valuable tax attributes do not survive liquidation, they are 
overlooked.60  The problem is exacerbated by the fact that these tax 
attributes are often omitted from the debtor’s asset disclosures.61  This 
amounts to a perfect storm, where some of bankruptcy’s most vital 
protective devices neglect to take into account what is often the debtor’s 
most valuable asset.  As I argue in this Article, this extraordinary ambiguity 
at the intersection of federal tax and bankruptcy law not only facilitates 
inequitable allocations of economic benefits and burdens in Chapter 11 but 
also causes a much broader, systematic misallocation of resources.  In 
particular, it contributes to an overall reduction in social welfare, as parties 
in a position to exploit the information asymmetry and control the 
restructuring are able to monetize the tax assets as excess returns and then 
use them to shelter income from unrelated assets.62 
This ambiguity and its negative collateral consequences should be 
addressed now because both the Tax Code and the Bankruptcy Code are the 
subject of major reform efforts.  President Obama has expressed interest in 
corporate tax reforms, with policymakers in both political parties studying 
proposals.63  At the same time, the American Bankruptcy Institute recently 
convened the Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, laying the 
groundwork for a comprehensive rewriting of Chapter 11.64  As 
policymakers work to reshape the corporate tax system and the commercial 
bankruptcy framework, special attention must be given to the areas of 
overlap. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I offers those new to the literature 
a short overview of commercial bankruptcy under Chapter 11.  Part I also 
contains a discussion of various bankruptcy-specific provisions of the Tax 
Code.  Part II revisits the Solyndra case and others to understand the role of 
valuable tax attributes in large commercial bankruptcies.  This Part reveals 
how these tax attributes not only give the bankruptcy estate its intrinsic 
value, but also become a source of excess returns for persons in a position 
to exploit the restructuring.  Part III proposes a new legal framework for the 
 
 60. See supra notes 43–44. 
 61. See supra note 33.  In the Solyndra case, the government complained about this very 
issue. See Objection of the United States of America, on Behalf of the Department of Energy 
and the IRS, to Debtors’ Motion for an Order at 4, In re Solyndra LLC, No. 11-12799 
(Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 24, 2012) (“Nowhere does the Disclosure Statement describe, quantify, 
or estimate the potential value [of] these net operating losses, which [Solyndra]’s equity 
owners intend to take out of this bankruptcy under the Plan.”).  Debtors typically decline to 
disclose valuable tax attributes in preliminary asset disclosures, only later describing them in 
subsequent disclosures buried in hundreds of pages of material submitted at the plan 
confirmation stage of the case. See infra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 62. On the relationship between excess returns and overall social welfare, see TULLOCK, 
supra note 58. 
 63. See, e.g., John D. McKinnon, Obama’s Budget Seeks Overhaul of Business-Tax 
Codes, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2014, 7:53 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142
4052702304360704579419073375887800. 
 64. Katy Stech, Bankruptcy Leaders Call for Chapter 11 Overhaul, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
19, 2012, 5:30 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2012/04/19/bankruptcy-leaders-call-
for-chapter-11-overhaul/. 
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treatment of valuable tax attributes in commercial bankruptcies, based on 
the arguments developed in Part II. 
I.  BACKGROUND:  THE INTERSECTION OF CHAPTER 11 
BANKRUPTCY AND TAX LAW 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy is frequently described as a legal process that 
offers debtors much-needed “breathing room” from the demands of 
creditors.65  The filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an estate that 
includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property.”66  
Although, under this broad definition, all of the debtor’s assets are deemed 
property of the bankruptcy estate,67 the debtor typically retains possession 
and may continue to operate its business.68  Meanwhile, the commencement 
of a bankruptcy case also imposes an automatic stay, which enjoins 
creditors from enforcing pre-petition obligations or exercising remedies 
against the debtor’s property.69 
With creditors barred from pursuing collections during the pendency of 
the case, attention quickly shifts to negotiating the debtor’s exit from 
bankruptcy on terms that will allow maximum repayment of claims.  A 
Chapter 11 debtor emerges from bankruptcy by obtaining judicial 
confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan.70  A plan ordinarily classifies claims 
against the estate, delineates the debtor’s future as a going concern, and 
identifies any cash or property distributions to be made to each class of 
claimants.71 
Traditionally, Chapter 11 plans contemplate reorganization of the 
debtor.72  Under these so-called plans of reorganization, claimants may 
receive equity interests in the debtor or in a newly formed company in 
exchange for all or part of their claims.73  Alternatively, under a “plan of 
liquidation,” the debtor may propose to sell its assets, distribute proceeds to 
 
 65. See, e.g., 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013) (noting as a “fundamental purpose[] of the Bankruptcy Code” 
the “breathing room given to a debtor that attempts to make a fresh start”); Local Loan Co. 
v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“[Bankruptcy] gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor 
. . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure 
and discouragement of preexisting debt.”). 
 66. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012).  As this expansive language suggests, Congress intended 
a wide range of property to be included in the bankruptcy estate. See United States v. 
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983). 
 67. “The scope of [§ 541(a)(1)] is broad.  It includes all kinds of property, including 
tangible or intangible property, causes of action . . . and all other forms of property currently 
specified in section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 367 (1977); S. 
REP. NO. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5868, 6323. 
 68. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1108. 
 69. See id. § 362.  The court can grant relief from the automatic stay only under certain 
specified conditions or for cause. See id.; see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001. 
 70. 11 U.S.C. § 1141. 
 71. Id. § 1123. 
 72. See supra note 13. 
 73. For instance, in the General Motors bankruptcy, creditors received equity security 
interests in a newly formed company. Parker v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors 
Liquidation Co.), 430 B.R. 65, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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creditors in satisfaction of their claims, and then dissolve.74  While the latter 
plan achieves substantially the same outcome as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, 
the debtor is able to manage the sale of its assets under Chapter 11.75 
Broadly speaking, the Chapter 11 plan is a distributional exercise, 
detailing how and to what extent economic benefits and burdens will be 
borne by various constituents.  Acknowledging the significance of the plan 
to the bankrupt company, the Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor the 
exclusive right to file a Chapter 11 plan for a period of 120 days.76  In 
addition to its draft plan, the debtor must also prepare adequate financial 
and nonfinancial disclosures.77 
Once proposed, the Chapter 11 plan is subject to a vote by classes of the 
bankrupt company’s creditors and equity security holders.78  In some cases, 
the debtor and its creditors are able to negotiate a Chapter 11 plan that all 
classes either affirmatively accept or are deemed to accept because they will 
be paid in full, such that their interests are not impaired.79  In cases of this 
sort, the bankruptcy court must confirm the plan unless the plan proponent 
is unable to meet its burden of proving certain additional requirements.80  
For instance, the plan must be feasible, proposed in good faith, and not 
violate any applicable laws.81 
Typically, however, a Chapter 11 plan faces opposition from one or more 
classes.  In these cases, at least one class of impaired claims must vote in 
favor of the plan.82  Additionally, with respect to each impaired class of 
claims or interests, under the plan each holder must receive property equal 
to or greater than the amount that such holder would so receive if the debtor 
were liquidated under Chapter 7.83  In other words, the claimants should be 
 
 74. See supra note 44.  For an example of a plan of liquidation, see supra note 23. 
 75. See supra note 20. 
 76. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b). 
 77. With respect to plans of reorganization, the debtor must also provide an estimate of 
the value of the debtor as a going concern. See id. § 1125.  Reorganization value, or 
“enterprise value,” is used to determine value received or retained in the form of equity 
security interests in the debtor.  Under GAAP, enterprise value is the “fair value” of the 
company before liabilities.  Fair value refers to “the price that would be received to sell [an] 
asset . . . in an orderly transaction between market participants . . . at the measurement date.” 
FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 
157 (2006) (effective Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://www.fasb.org/summary/
stsum157.shtml. 
 78. 11 U.S.C. § 1126.  Consent thresholds are explored in greater detail in David Arthur 
Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 
78 VA. L. REV. 461, 467 (1992). 
 79. For a discussion of a recent uncontested Chapter 11 plan, see Peg Brickley, 
GateHouse Media Wins Confirmation of Chapter 11 Restructuring, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 6, 
2013, 3:36 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20131106-713150.html. 
 80. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a). 
 81. See id. (setting forth the remaining elements of plan approval). 
 82. Id. § 1129(a)(10).  “Insiders” are not taken into account for the purposes of 
satisfying this requirement. Id.  In bankruptcy law, the term “insider” includes a person in 
control of the debtor, as well as any person so closely related to the debtor as to suggest that 
any transactions were not conducted at arm’s length. Id. § 101(31)(B)(iii). 
 83. Id. § 1129(a)(7). 
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given at least what they would receive if the debtor were liquidated.84  
Finally, the bankruptcy court may “cramdown”85 the plan over the 
objections of a dissenting class only if certain additional statutory 
requirements are satisfied.86  Chief among these is the condition that a plan 
be “fair and equitable” with respect to dissenting classes.87  A plan is fair 
and equitable if members of the dissenting class receive property equal in 
value to their permitted claims or, to the extent the class receives less than 
this amount, no creditor of lesser priority (or any equity security holder)88 
receives any distribution under the plan.89  This requirement, which is a 
core tenet of bankruptcy law, is known as the “absolute priority rule.”90  It 
serves as an important safeguard for creditors by ensuring that, unless their 
claims are paid in full or they agree otherwise, the Chapter 11 plan will—
with limited exceptions91—respect the relative collection rights of creditors 
under state law.92 
As this brief overview reveals, Chapter 11 principally functions to 
preserve all potential sources of economic value that can be used to satisfy 
the debtor’s obligations, while setting legal parameters on the distribution 
of such wealth.  By imposing these protective distributional norms, Chapter 
11 allows debtors to continue their business operations while negotiating 
with creditors to restructure their financial obligations.  Against this 
backdrop, the following sections consider how the tax laws not only 
facilitate a firm’s use of federal bankruptcy process to resolve financial 
 
 84. Id. This test is commonly known as the “best interests of creditors” test. See 
generally Jonathan Hicks, Note, Foxes Guarding the Henhouse:  The Modern Best Interests 
of Creditors Test in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 5 NEV. L.J. 820 (2005). 
 85. This term does not appear in the Bankruptcy Code, but is used to refer to judicial 
confirmation of a plan notwithstanding the objections of dissenting impaired classes. See 
generally Charles D. Booth, The Cramdown on Secured Creditors:  An Impetus Toward 
Settlement, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69, 69 (1986). 
 86. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. But see infra note 91 (discussing the “new value exception” to the absolute 
priority rule). 
 89. See Booth, supra note 85. 
 90. The doctrine, presently codified at § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), originated in judicial 
opinions. See, e.g., Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913); see also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining 
After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738 (1988); 
Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate 
Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 651 (1974); Ralph Brubaker & Charles Tabb, 
Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1375, 1391 (referring to the absolute priority rule as “one of the most central, 
fundamental distribution-value protections of a chapter 11 plan”). 
 91. See infra notes 210–12 and accompanying text. 
 92. The rights of secured and unsecured creditors are determined under state law, in 
statutes and case law governing contracts, debtor-creditor relations, as well as liens in real 
and personal property.  For instance, the relative priority of secured creditors and other lien 
holders are set forth in the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in each state. See, e.g., 
U.C.C. § 9-317 (2000) (setting forth the basic rule governing priority between lien creditors 
and secured parties); id. § 9-322(a)(1) (setting forth the basic rule governing priority among 
conflicting security interests). 
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distress, but also unexpectedly generate additional value for the bankruptcy 
estate. 
A.  Bankruptcy-Related Tax Provisions 
Certain tax laws are designed to work in conjunction with the Bankruptcy 
Code, enabling companies to resolve financial distress via the bankruptcy 
process without harsh tax consequences.  For instance, bankruptcy-related 
provisions of the Tax Code extend nonrecognition treatment to certain 
transactions entered into by bankrupt companies93 and permanently exclude 
some of a debtor’s income from taxation.94  Whether we view these 
provisions as necessary and legitimate exceptions that allow for a truer 
picture of the debtor’s income95 or as preferential departures from the 
normal taxing system that amount to “tax expenditures”96 of governmental 
 
 93. See infra notes 98–103 and accompanying text. 
 94. See infra notes 104–11 and accompanying text. 
 95. The normal taxing system assigns tax consequences to realization events, such as 
dispositions of assets.  This generally means that less income is taxed than would be under a 
pure economic definition of income. See, e.g., HENRY C. SIMONS, INCOME TAXATION 50 
(1938) (setting forth what is now known as the Haig-Simons definition of income:  “the 
algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change 
in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in 
question”); see also Charlene Luke, What Would Henry Simons Do?:  Using an Ideal To 
Shape and Explain the Economic Substance Doctrine, 11 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 108, 127 
(2011) (providing a thorough discussion of the Haig-Simons definition of income).  
However, the normal taxing system can also result in the imposition of the income tax even 
where there is no income in an economic sense.  Nonrecognition rules are an attempt to 
bring the normal taxing system into better alignment with the economic definition of income. 
 96. Tax expenditures are defined under the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974 as “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws 
which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which 
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3(3), 
88 Stat. 297.  Tax expenditure analysis was famously introduced by Stanley Surrey and 
further developed by Surrey and Paul McDaniel. See generally STANLEY S. SURREY, 
PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973); STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX 
EXPENDITURES (1985); Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure 
Concept:  Current Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. REV. 225 (1979); Stanley 
S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act of 
1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 679 (1976); Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury, Excerpts from Remarks Before the Money Marketeers on the U.S. 
Income Tax System—the Need for a Full Accounting (Nov. 15, 1967), in U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, DOC. NO. 3245, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE 
STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1968, at 322 (1969).  As a 
conceptual framework, tax expenditure analysis first assumes a normal income tax, based 
upon “the definition of net income, the specification of accounting rules, the determination 
of the entities subject to tax, the determination of the rate schedule and exemption levels” 
which comprise the “revenue-raising aspects of the tax.” SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra, at 3.  
Then, the concept invites analysts to identify any deviations from the normal revenue-raising 
structure of the income tax system, in the form of exemptions, exclusions, deductions, 
credits, deferral, and preferential tax rates.  These deviations are assessed as a form of 
government spending, albeit through forgone tax revenue rather than direct expenditures. 
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resources,97 in either case, they function to protect the interests of bankrupt 
companies and their stakeholders. 
For example, as noted above, the Tax Code extends nonrecognition 
treatment to certain acquisitions of a debtor’s assets.98  “Nonrecognition 
treatment” means that the transaction will be tax-free to the parties if certain 
other requirements are met.99  At least one party to the acquisition must be 
under bankruptcy court jurisdiction and the court must approve the transfer 
of assets.100  As a deviation from broader provisions of the Tax Code that 
impose the income tax on wealth realized through dispositions of assets,101 
nonrecognition treatment is provided to transactions that demonstrate 
continuity of investment and continuity of business enterprise.102  This 
treatment is premised on the belief that while the form of an investment has 
changed, its economic substance remains the same:  qualifying transactions 
are merely adjustments of continuing interests in property under a new 
corporate form.103 
The Tax Code also offers favorable treatment to insolvent persons 
through an exception to cancellation of indebtedness rules.  Under the 
normal income tax structure, cancelled debt is considered income.104  
Although the borrower does not receive cash at the time a debt is 
discharged, the borrower’s net worth improves in an amount equal to the 
forgiven obligation.105  However, a taxpayer may exclude cancelled debt 
from gross income if the taxpayer is insolvent at the time of the debt 
 
 97. As the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation explains, the distinction is not 
always clear:  “The determination of whether a provision is a tax expenditure is made on the 
basis of a broad concept of income that is larger in scope than ‘income’ as defined under 
general U.S. income tax principles.  The Joint Committee staff uses its judgment in 
distinguishing between those income tax provisions (and regulations) that can be viewed as 
part of normal income tax law and those special provisions that result in tax expenditures.” 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 
2012–2017, at 2 (2013). 
 98. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(G) (2012).  The acquisition of a debtor’s assets will be a 
nonrecognition event if the stock or securities of the acquiring corporation are distributed in 
a transaction that qualifies under §§ 354, 355, or 356 of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Id. § 368(a)(3)(B)(ii).  For instance, a debtor’s equity security holders would not 
recognize gain or loss if they exchanged their equity interests for stock or securities of either 
the corporation acquiring the debtor’s assets or a corporation controlled by the acquiring 
corporation. Id. §§ 354, 355.  However, gain must be recognized to the extent of any money 
or other property received. Id. § 356. 
 101. See supra note 95.  Under normal income tax law, dispositions of property are 
taxable pursuant to the calculation described in I.R.C. § 1001. 
 102. To receive nonrecognition treatment for reorganizations described in I.R.C. § 368, 
transactions must also satisfy nonstatutory requirements set forth in accompanying 
regulations.  The principal tests are the continuity of interest and continuity of business 
enterprise requirements, which are described in Treasury Regulations § 1.368-1 (2011) and 
§ 1.368-2 (2010). 
 103. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (2011). 
 104. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12); United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 2 (1931); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.61-12 (as amended in 1997). 
 105. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12. 
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discharge.106  This exception codifies a longstanding view that the insolvent 
debtor does not have income, as a definitional matter.107 
Yet in a quiet departure from these established principles of taxation, the 
Tax Code also permanently excludes cancellation of indebtedness income 
where the discharge occurs pursuant to a bankruptcy case,108 regardless of 
the debtor’s solvency at the time of the discharge.109  Although the latter 
provision is not identified as a tax expenditure,110 it functions as such by 
extending a special exclusion from the broad concept of income.  However, 
the benefits are not without some limitations; under both the insolvency and 
bankruptcy exception, the taxpayer’s valuable tax attributes must be 
reduced in an amount equal to the cancelled debt excluded from gross 
income.111 
Through bankruptcy-specific tax provisions of this sort, the government 
declines to impose the federal income tax on certain transactions entered 
into by bankrupt companies.  While these provisions seem to reflect a 
legislative intent to capture a truer picture of the debtor’s income, and thus 
were probably not intended to function as tax expenditures, they may be 
overbroad as codified.  In a world where companies can use Chapter 11 for 
strategic112 and even abusive purposes,113 rather than merely as a vehicle 
for reorganizing financially troubled companies, it may not be appropriate 
to extend beneficial tax treatment to all bankrupt debtors.114  I return to this 
point in subsequent sections.  In the meantime, the following section draws 
upon the concept of tax expenditures to identify a type of favorable tax 
treatment that goes even further, effectively transforming certain of the 
debtor’s tax attributes into marketable property. 
 
 
 106. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B). 
 107. The distinction highlights the difference between definitional income and economic 
income. See, e.g., Hirsch v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 115 F.2d 656, 657 (7th Cir. 1940) 
(“In determining what constitutes income, substance rather than form is to be given 
controlling weight.”).  Although the discharge of indebtedness causes an accession to wealth, 
the insolvent debtor who receives a discharge does not enjoy “gain from capital and labor, or 
from either of them, or in profit gained through the sale or conversion of capital.” Bowers v. 
Kerbaugh-Empire, 271 U.S. 170, 175 (1926).  Thus, the transaction does not lead to income; 
rather, as the Supreme Court noted, such a transaction results in a loss. Id.  The Court’s 
holding was later codified into a predecessor statute to § 108. See Act of June 29, 1939, Pub. 
L. No. 76-155, 53 Stat. 862, 875 (codified at I.R.C. § 22(b)(9) (1939)). 
 108. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 109. Id. § 108(a)(2)(A) (clarifying that the requirement that a taxpayer be insolvent at the 
time of the discharge is not applicable where the discharge occurs in a bankruptcy case). 
 110. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 97, at 5. 
 111. See I.R.C. § 108(b)(1).  The taxpayer’s tax attributes are reduced in the order 
provided in the statute. Id. 
 112. See Dick, supra note 22, at 778; see also infra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 113. See In re S. Beach Sec., Inc., 606 F.3d 366, 376 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting a debtor’s 
abusive Chapter 11 plan). 
 114. This point will be discussed in future sections.  See infra Part III.A. 
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B.  Tax Law’s Treatment of a Debtor’s Tax Attributes in Bankruptcy 
One need only scan bankruptcy-related news stories to appreciate the 
importance of tax attributes, such as net operating losses (NOLs), in 
Chapter 11.115  They carry significance because, under federal tax law, 
certain tax attributes of a bankrupt debtor are deemed transferred to its 
bankruptcy estate.116  For instance, property that is part of the bankruptcy 
estate maintains its historical adjusted basis, holding period, and 
character.117  Similarly, NOL carryovers,118 capital loss carryovers,119 and 
tax credit carryovers120 are transferred to the estate.121 
In Chapter 11, the debtor is expected to identify and allocate economic 
value pursuant to a fair and equitable plan; tax attributes introduce a number 
of conceptual challenges.  Although at first glance tax attributes are mere 
bookkeeping entries, many such attributes are subjectively valued by 
stakeholders and also capable of objective appraisal.122  To gain a better 
sense of how they function as assets, the following sections consider tax 
attributes from both an accounting and legal perspective. 
1.  Tax Attributes As Assets Under 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
Because bankruptcy necessarily requires an inventory of the debtor’s 
assets and liabilities, a preliminary question is whether valuable tax 
attributes are bankruptcy “assets.”  Under generally accepted accounting 
 
 115. See, e.g., Marie Beaudette & Jacqueline Palank, Kodak Files Plan To Exit 
Bankruptcy Protection, WALL ST. J. (May 1, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424127887324266904578457030412008730 (noting sizable NOLs in 
Kodak’s bankruptcy estate); Erik Holm & Eric Morath, Ambac Files for Chapter 11, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870
3514904575602911478916800 (noting substantial NOLs in Ambac’s bankruptcy estate). 
 116. I.R.C. § 1398. 
 117. Id. § 1398(g)(6). 
 118. Companies accrue NOLs when deductions exceed gross income during the tax year. 
Id. § 172. Once accrued, NOLs can be used to offset income in a different tax year. Id. 
§ 172(b)(1)(A). Specifically, NOLs may be carried back and applied against income in 
previous years, or carried forward and applied against income in subsequent years. Id. 
§ 172(b)(2). 
 119. Individual taxpayers are permitted to deduct a maximum of $3,000 of net capital 
losses (total capital losses less total capital gains) in any given tax year. Id. § 1211(b).  Net 
capital losses in excess of $3,000 may be carried forward to subsequent tax years, subject to 
the same limitation of being deductible only to the extent of capital gains plus a maximum 
additional deduction of $3,000. See id. § 1212(b).  Corporate taxpayers do not have the 
benefit of the additional $3,000 and have greater restrictions on the number of years 
carryforwards are permitted.  However, corporate taxpayers are permitted a limited 
carryback, which is not available to noncorporate taxpayers. Id. § 1212(a). 
 120. For instance, certain unused business and investment credits may be carried forward 
to subsequent years. See, e.g., id. § 39 (allowing for the carryforward of unused general 
business credits); id. § 904(c) (allowing for the carryforward of unused foreign tax credits). 
 121. See id. § 1398(g). 
 122. Conflicting approaches to the appraisal of tax attributes are considered in In re 
Washington Mutual, Inc., 461 B.R. 200, 231–32 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), vacated in part, No. 
08-12229 (MFW), 2012 WL 1563880 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24, 2012). 
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principles (GAAP),123 an asset is any “probable future economic benefit[] 
obtained or controlled by a particular entity as a result of past transactions 
or events.”124  Flowing from this broad definition, certain tax attributes, 
such as loss and credit carryovers, are recorded on a company’s balance 
sheet as “deferred tax assets.”125  This designation reflects the fact that 
these tax attributes have the potential to reduce a subsequent period’s 
income tax expense and can therefore be presently valued.126  For instance, 
NOLs may generally be carried back two years to generate tax refunds and 
forward twenty years to reduce future taxable income.127 
Tax attributes are often the most sizable asset of a struggling company,128 
with a face value that can exceed the company’s market capitalization.129  
For this reason, whether inside or outside of bankruptcy, companies take 
great pains to protect their valuable tax attributes.130  But while tax 
attributes are consistently treated as assets under accounting principles, they 
are not generally disclosed to the bankruptcy court in the debtor’s initial 
asset disclosures.131  From a formal perspective, the requisite disclosure 
form does not expressly call for disclosures of tax attributes.132  Further, as 
 
 123. GAAP are uniform standards of, and guidelines to, financial accounting and 
reporting. See Frequently Asked Questions, AM. INST. CPAS, http://www.aicpa.org/About/
FAQs/Pages/FAQs.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).  The Financial Accounting Standards 
Board and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board are authorized by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission to establish these principles. See id. 
 124. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
CONCEPTS NO. 6:  ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 16 (1985). 
 125. Under GAAP, deferred tax assets represent the increase in taxes refundable (or 
saved) in future years as a result of deductible temporary differences existing at the end of 
the current year. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 48:  
ACCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES 2 (2006). 
 126. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS NO. 109, at 5 (1992). 
 127. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 128. See, e.g., Bill Rochelle, Harrisburg, Madoff, Ambac, Old GM, Friendly:  
Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2011-10-14/harrisburg-madoff-ambac-old-gm-friendly-bankruptcy.html (noting that a 
commercial debtor declared that its NOLs were its most valuable asset); Robert Willens, CIT 
Moves To Protect Its NOLs, CFO.COM (Dec. 28, 2009), http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-
tax/2009/12/cit-moves-to-protect-its-nols/ (describing the steps taken by CIT Group Inc. to 
protect its NOLs as a vitally important asset). 
 129. Such was the case in Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enterprises, Inc., No. 4241-VCN, 
2010 WL 703062 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2010), discussed infra notes 260–66 and accompanying 
text. 
 130. Outside of bankruptcy, the “poison pill” is becoming an increasingly common 
planning device to protect NOLs.  This strategy has been given scholarly attention recently. 
See, e.g., Michael R. Patrone, Case Note, Is the “Tax Poison Pill” the Last Stand for 
Protecting NOLs After Health Care Reform?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 11 (2010). 
 131. For instance, Judge Posner notes that although NOLs were the only asset of Chapter 
11 debtor South Beach Securities, Inc., they were not disclosed as assets in the company’s 
initial asset disclosures. In re S. Beach Sec., Inc., 606 F.3d 366, 373 (7th Cir. 2010); see also 
supra note 33; infra note 133. 
 132. See B 6B (Official Form 6B), Schedule B—Personal Property, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_1207/B_006B_1207f.
pdf.  The debtor’s valuable tax attributes could potentially come under item 18, “Other 
liquidated debts owed to debtor including tax refunds.” Id.  However, most debtors do not 
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a matter of customary practice, debtors do not typically disclose valuable 
tax attributes under any asset categories, even going so far as to omit them 
expressly as “excluded assets.”133 
While there is no legislative or rulemaking history clarifying this 
omission,134 there are two possible explanations.  On the one hand, the 
oversight may be traced to a blurred distinction between an asset and its 
valuation; alternatively, the oversight may reflect deeper uncertainty as to 
whether these assets qualify as property of the estate.135  These potential 
explanations are considered in greater detail in the following sections. 
2.  Assigning Value to Tax Attributes Under GAAP 
Under GAAP, deferred tax assets are subject to valuation rules that 
reduce their carrying value to what the company might reasonably realize in 
the future, taking into account any impairment costs.136  These rules, which 
were designed to prevent companies from overstating their financial 
position, require companies to consider the totality of evidence, both 
positive and negative, when assigning value to assets.137  With respect to 
deferred tax assets, a company must take into account a “valuation 
allowance” if it is more likely than not that all or part of the tax asset will 
not be realized on future tax returns.138  While the analysis naturally relies 
heavily upon subjective judgments, companies are required to give greater 
weight to evidence that can be objectively verified.139 
In accordance with these requirements, companies that are experiencing 
severe economic difficulties generally take a full valuation allowance for 
any deferred tax assets.140  This conservative stance reflects an assumption 
that the company’s poor past performance strongly suggests that it will not 
 
fully disclose valuable tax attributes here or elsewhere in their disclosures; this is likely a 
function of the valuation principles discussed infra Part I.B.2. 
 133. See, e.g., Schedule of Assets and Liabilities for Eastman Kodak Co. at 5, Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Apple Inc. (In re Eastman Kodak Co.), No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 18, 2012) (noting as a disclaimer that the asset disclosures exclude tax accruals). 
 134. Bankruptcy law is unique in that statutory interpretation and policymaking resides 
almost entirely with the courts rather than with administrative agencies. See Rafael I. Pardo 
& Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 
UCLA L. REV. 384, 391 (2012). 
 135. For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between an asset and its valuation, 
see infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 136. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 126, at 5–6. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Id. at 6. 
 139. See id. 
 140. For instance, the struggling oil and gas company Ultra Petroleum took a full 
valuation allowance against its deferred tax assets in 2012. Ultra Petroleum Corp., Annual 
Report (Form 10-K), at 42–43 (Dec. 31, 2012); see also Zoltek Cos., Quarterly Report (Form 
10-Q), at 13 (June 30, 2012) (“The Company has recorded a full valuation allowance against 
its deferred tax assets in Hungary, the United States and Mexico because it is more likely 
than not that the value of the deferred tax assets will not be realized.”); The Spectranetics 
Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 12 (Mar. 31, 2012) (“Due to the Company’s history 
of losses and the lack of sufficient certainty of generating future taxable income, the 
Company has recorded a full valuation allowance against its deferred tax assets.”). 
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generate profits in the near future.  When a company takes a full valuation 
allowance, its deferred tax assets are reflected with zero value on financial 
statements.141 
Of course, companies that are suffering economic difficulties are often 
the very companies that eventually file for bankruptcy.  For instance, 
Solyndra’s financial statements leading up to its bankruptcy filing reflect 
zero value for its deferred tax assets, accompanied by the following 
notation:  “Due to its history of operating losses, the Company has recorded 
a full valuation allowance against its deferred tax assets.”142  Because of 
this, the company’s initial asset disclosures to the bankruptcy court—which 
do not contain any reference to tax attributes—are facially consistent with 
financial statements that recorded zero value for deferred tax assets.143  
Thus, it seems that the interaction of accounting rules and federal 
bankruptcy procedure yields a peculiar result:  one of the debtor’s most 
important assets is not disclosed at the outset of the bankruptcy case.  But 
there is another possible explanation for the lack of disclosure:  although 
tax attributes are “assets,” they may not be consistently thought of as 
“property” of the estate.  The following section considers this theoretical 
question in the context of tax and bankruptcy law. 
3.  Transferability of Tax Attributes:  General Rules 
Tax attributes are undeniably an important source of value to most 
bankruptcy estates, even after taking into account any reductions caused by 
anticipated cancellation of indebtedness.144  Thus it is not surprising that, as 
the previous section articulates, they are recognized as assets under modern 
accounting principles.  But with respect to their treatment in bankruptcy 
law, a wider question remains:  Are valuable tax attributes property of the 
estate?  Or are they merely legal entitlements, reflecting the debtor’s future 
and highly contingent ability to receive value by operation of the tax laws?  
The question implicates a principal distinction in property law:  “not only is 
there valueless property, but there is also propertyless value . . . .  [I]n short, 
property is not wealth.”145  Thus, what amounts to an “asset” under modern 
accounting principles may not be “property” in a legal sense.146 
 
 141. See supra note 140. 
 142. Consolidated Financial Statements of Solyndra, Inc., (Amendment No. 1 to Form S-
1), at 168 (Mar. 16, 2010). 
 143. See sources cited supra note 33. 
 144. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 145. Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 364 (1954). 
 146. As a legal concept, private property is defined as “a right vested in individuals 
thought of as set over against one another, . . . requir[ing] the recognition and protection of 
society for its existence.” ALEXANDER LINDSAY, ESSAY IN PROPERTY:  ITS DUTIES AND 
RIGHTS 70 (2d ed. 1922); see also RESTATEMENT OF PROP. ch. 1 intro. note (1936); Cohen, 
supra note 145, at 363–64.  The question of whether an asset is “property” has received 
scholarly attention in other contexts. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, The Unique Benefits of 
Treating Personal Goodwill As Property in Corporate Acquisitions, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5 
(2005) (considering personal goodwill as property rather than the present value of future 
earnings potential). 
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Generally speaking, tax attributes are a difficult asset to convey or 
monetize.  In this way, they behave more like a legal entitlement than 
private property.  Although the debtor’s tax attributes are deemed 
transferred to the bankruptcy estate in a Chapter 11 case,147 they do not 
survive the debtor’s liquidation148 and cannot be passed directly to 
stakeholders pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan.  These limitations on direct 
transfers reflect the nature of the corporate income tax generally:  to the 
extent an entity is taxed as a corporation under Subchapter C of the Tax 
Code, its gains and losses do not flow through to its shareholders.149  
Accordingly, with the exception of corporations that elect either to file a 
consolidated return150 or to be taxed under Subchapter S of the Tax 
Code,151 there is generally152 no mechanism in the tax laws—whether in 
bankruptcy or otherwise—for a corporation to distribute valuable tax 
attributes, such as NOLs or tax credits, to any other persons, including the 
corporation’s shareholders.153 
Moreover, the tax laws also impose restrictions on the indirect transfers 
of valuable tax attributes.  Although such limitations technically expand the 
future tax liabilities of certain taxpayers, they are not characterized by the 
government as “negative tax expenditures,”154 but rather as compliance and 
enforcement provisions that prevent abuse.155  In the case of NOLs, 
Congress was especially concerned about “exploit[ation] by persons other 
than those who incurred the loss.”156  This is because, while loss carrybacks 
and carryforwards are theoretically necessary to temper the economic 
distortions that arise when a business cycle fails to fall neatly within the 
 
 147. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text. 
 149. I.R.C. § 11 (2012) (imposing a tax on the taxable income of every corporation).  In 
contrast, the Tax Code provides that entities taxed as partnerships, “shall not be subject to 
the income tax imposed by this chapter.  Persons carrying on business as partners shall be 
liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities.” Id. § 701.  Thus, while 
the Tax Code creates a flow through regime for partnerships, it directly taxes corporations.  
Therefore, with the exception of those corporations that elect either to file a consolidated 
return or to be taxed under Subchapter S of the Tax Code, gains and losses of the corporation 
are used to calculate income tax liability at the entity level. 
 150. See id. § 1501. 
 151. The election is made pursuant to I.R.C. § 1362 by eligible corporations. See id. 
§ 1362.  Upon so electing, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided . . . an S corporation shall not be 
subject to [federal income taxes].” Id. § 1363(a).  Thus, gains and losses flow through to the 
shareholders, who are liable for income tax only in their individual capacities. 
 152. For examples of highly specific exceptions to this general rule, see supra note 39. 
 153. All corporations other than those qualified corporations who make the election to be 
taxed as S Corporations are subject to taxation under Subchapter C of Chapter 1 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (as amended in 
2012) (the “check the box” entity classification regulations). 
 154. By “negative tax expenditures,” I mean “[t]ax provisions that provide treatment less 
favorable than normal income tax law and are not related directly to progressivity.” JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 97, at 3. 
 155. Id. 
 156. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 42 (1954). The same concerns motivated more recent 
amendments to the Tax Code. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH 
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 294 (Comm. Print 
1987). 
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taxable year,157 it would violate the important principle of tax neutrality to 
allow loss carryovers to be used to offset income earned by a different 
taxpayer via indirect transfers, such as through a change in ownership of a 
corporate taxpayer. 
Advancing this legislative intent, broad anti-abuse rules thwart taxpayers 
from acquiring unprofitable companies to harvest their mounting tax losses 
and use them to shelter income.158  For example, a longstanding anti-abuse 
provision of the Tax Code states, in pertinent part, “If any person or persons 
acquire . . . control of a corporation, . . . and the principal purpose for which 
such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax 
. . . then the Secretary may disallow such deduction, credit, or other 
allowance.”159 
Due to the evidentiary challenges associated with a standards-based 
approach of this sort,160 Congress subsequently enacted a bright-line rule to 
limit the ability of a company to indirectly transfer its valuable tax 
attributes to other persons through a change of ownership.161  Under this 
rule, a change of ownership occurs if the percentage of a corporation’s 
shares held directly or indirectly by one or more of its 5 percent 
stockholders increases by more than fifty percentage points over the lowest 
percentage of shares owned by those shareholders at any time during a 
three-year period.162  In other words, if enough of a company’s stock 
changes hands, the corporation will face restrictions on the use of its prior 
losses to offset future income. 
 
 157. The Joint Committee staff explains that “normal income tax law would provide for 
the carryback and carryforward of net operating losses . . . .  [T]he general limits on the 
number of years that such losses may be carried back or forward were chosen for reasons of 
administrative convenience and compliance concerns and may be assumed to represent 
normal income tax law.” JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 97, at 8.  Theoretical 
justifications for NOLs have been discussed in the academic literature. See Michelle M. 
Arnopol, Why Have Chapter 11 Bankruptcies Failed So Miserably?  A Reappraisal of 
Congressional Attempts To Protect a Corporation’s Net Operating Losses After Bankruptcy, 
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 133, 138 (1992); Daniel L. Simmons, Net Operating Losses and 
Section 382:  Searching for a Limitation on Loss Carryovers, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1045, 1057 
(1989); J. Henry Wilkinson, Jr., The Net Operating Loss Deduction and Related Income Tax 
Devices, 45 TEX. L. REV. 809, 855 (1967). 
 158. Some of the legislative concerns are highlighted in H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337 (1954). 
 159. I.R.C. § 269(a)(1) (2012). 
 160. Section 269(a)(1) is so rarely used to defeat transactions because, for the principal 
purpose of a transaction to be tax avoidance, the purpose of tax evasion has to clearly 
overshadow any other purpose. See U.S. Shelter Corp. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 606, 621 
(1987) (discussing evidentiary challenges). 
 161. I.R.C. § 382 was initially enacted over fifty years ago.  The section was substantially 
overhauled in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS § 95.5.1 (2003). 
 162. I.R.C. § 382(g).  A “5 percent stockholder” is a shareholder who held at least 5 
percent of the company’s shares during the test period. Id.  All shareholders who do not own 
at least 5 percent of the company’s shares are aggregated and treated as a single 5 percent 
stockholder. Id.  Transfers between such stockholders are disregarded for purposes of 
determining whether an ownership change has occurred. Id.  Thus, so long as 50 percent or 
more of the shares is owned by less than 5 percent equity holders throughout the three-year 
testing period, there will be no change in control. Id. § 382(g)(4)(A).  These limitations are 
also triggered by certain tax-free reorganizations. See id. §§ 368(a)(1), 382(g)(1). 
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The restrictions on use of these tax assets are quite severe.  Generally 
speaking, where a change of ownership has occurred, the corporation’s 
ability to use its NOLs to reduce future income is capped at an annual rate 
equal to the value of the corporation immediately before the ownership 
change163 multiplied by the highest adjusted long-term tax exempt bond 
rate for that month and the two prior months.164  For example, if a company 
has $1,000 of NOLs and the fair market value of the company on the date 
of the change of ownership is only $500, then the available NOLs are 
reduced to $500.  Assuming a 3 percent bond rate at the time of the change 
of ownership, the annual usable value of the NOLs would be reduced to a 
meager $15.  If the corporation does not continue its historic business, its 
available NOLs generally are reduced to zero.165  These rules apply to the 
corporate merger, acquisition, and recapitalization context and were 
designed to neutralize the tax consequences of corporate investments.166  
With respect to other forms of valuable tax attributes, the same statute 
limits a corporation’s recognition of built-in losses during the five-year 
period following a change of ownership,167 while a successive statute limits 
indirect transfers of certain tax credit or capital loss carryovers.168 
Taken together, these rules effectively proscribe direct and indirect 
transfers of a corporation’s valuable tax attributes.  Thus, at least outside of 
bankruptcy,169 tax attributes are reminiscent of the “propertyless value” that 
courts must occasionally grapple with in cases under Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code.170  Like liquor licenses,171 Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) licenses,172 and other governmental 
permits that figure prominently in such cases, tax attributes are generally 
treated as creatures of statutory law, subject to direct and indirect transfer 
restrictions.173  Similarly, their future economic benefits are theoretically 
revocable by the government at any time, through revisions to federal tax 
laws, regulations, or interpretations thereof.174  Accordingly, while they 
 
 163. In determining the value of the corporation, I.R.C. § 382(l)(1) generally disregards 
any capital infusions received within two years of the ownership change. Id. § 382(l)(1). 
 164. Id.  The rate is published monthly by the U.S. Treasury. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2014-1, 
2014-2 I.R.B. 263 (providing the adjusted long term rates for January 2014). 
 165. I.R.C. § 382(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (2012). 
 166. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 161, § 95.5.1 (“Congress sought a limitation that 
would make NOL carryovers a relatively neutral factor in acquisitions.”). 
 167. I.R.C. § 382(h). 
 168. Id. § 383. 
 169. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 170. See, e.g., Jackson v. Miller (In re Jackson), 93 B.R. 421, 423 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) 
(stating that a purported security interest in a liquor license was void and of no effect 
because the license was classified as nonproperty under state law).  The issue of whether an 
asset constitutes “property” is important in cases of this sort, because Article 9 applies only 
to transactions “intended to create a security interest in personal property.” U.C.C. § 9-110 
(2010). 
 171. In re Jackson, 93 B.R. at 424. 
 172. See Thacker v. FCC (In re Magnacom Wireless, LLC), 503 F.3d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 
2007); Kidd Commc’n v. FCC, 427 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 173. See supra notes 148–62 and accompanying text. 
 174. See, e.g., In re Jartran, Inc., 44 B.R. 331, 380 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) (“[T]he 
realization of the tax savings [from use of NOLs] is subject to a number of contingencies, 
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may be regarded as assets, they usually function more like legal 
entitlements and less like property.175  But as the following section 
explores, special provisions in the Tax Code lift the restrictions on indirect 
transfers of certain tax attributes by corporate debtors in Chapter 11.  These 
rules have the effect of reversing any potential expansion of future tax 
liability caused by the compliance and enforcement rules described in this 
section.  Even more, they effectively transform the debtor’s valuable tax 
attributes from a legal entitlement to an item of property that can be 
monetized through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. 
4.  Transferability of Tax Attributes in Bankruptcy 
As the previous section explained, tax attributes are ordinarily subject to 
onerous restrictions on direct and indirect transfers.  With respect to the 
latter, the Tax Code imposes severe annual limitations on the future use of a 
corporation’s valuable tax attributes following a change of ownership.  In 
the bankruptcy context, these limitations would be especially burdensome:  
assuming that a bankrupt company has zero equity value as determined 
under GAAP,176 the requisite calculation for limiting the annual use of the 
company’s NOLs following a change of ownership would consistently 
return zero, thereby effectively eradicating all of the debtor’s NOLs.177 
In part to prevent this harsh outcome, drafters of the Tax Code crafted 
special rules to apply to changes of ownership that take place pursuant to a 
confirmed Chapter 11 plan.  These rules are quite generous, allowing a 
company to emerge from bankruptcy without any limitation on its future 
use of NOLs,178 and without the ordinarily applicable continuity of business 
enterprise requirement.179  To qualify for this preferential treatment, some 
 
including continuation in effect of relevant tax provisions . . . .”).  Likewise, the government 
can take steps to enhance the economic benefits associated with tax attributes. See, e.g., J. 
Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Can the Treasury Exempt Its Own Companies from 
Tax?  The $45 Billion GM NOL Carryforward, 1 CATO PAPERS PUB. POL’Y 1, 3–5 (2011) 
(describing the government’s issuance of a series of notices permitting General Motors to 
engage in a § 363 sale in Chapter 11 without subsequently running afoul of the Tax Code’s 
§ 382 NOL limitations). 
 175. This principle is reflected in Revenue Ruling 74-175, wherein the Internal Revenue 
Service declined to allow a decedent’s estate to deduct his losses, on the grounds that “only 
the taxpayer who sustains a loss is entitled to take the deduction.” Rev. Rul. 74-175, 1974-1 
C.B. 52. 
 176. Of course, this valuation would typically not assign value to the debtor’s tax 
attributes. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 177. This perverse outcome is noted in Kelly Kogan, Solyndra:  Now It’s IRS’s Turn, 217 
DAILY TAX REP. 1, 3 (2012). 
 178. I.R.C. § 382(l)(5) (2012). 
 179. See Treas. Reg. § 1.382-9(m)(1) (as amended in 1994) (“If section 382(l)(5) applies 
to an ownership change of a loss corporation, section 382(c) and the regulations thereunder 
do not apply with respect to the ownership change.”).  However, there is a limited continuity 
of business enterprise requirement under the more broadly applicable § 269. See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.269-3(d) (as amended in 1992) (“Absent strong evidence to the contrary, a requisite 
acquisition of control or property in connection with an ownership change to which section 
382(l)(5) applies is considered to be made for the principal purpose of evasion or avoidance 
of Federal income tax unless the corporation carries on more than an insignificant amount of 
an active trade or business . . . .”). 
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combination of historic shareholders and creditors of the bankrupt company 
must receive at least 50 percent of the reorganized debtor’s equity interests 
in full satisfaction of their claims against the debtor.180  In this way, the rule 
permits a change of ownership of the bankrupt company, and thus an 
indirect transfer of its valuable tax attributes.181  Relying on this provision, 
many Chapter 11 plans contemplate that creditors will receive equity 
interests in the debtor in exchange for all or part of their debt claims.182  It 
is important to note, however, that to the extent a second change of 
ownership occurs within two years of the Chapter 11 plan, the available 
NOLs will be effectively reduced to zero.183 
By allowing companies in Chapter 11 to retain the benefit of NOLs that 
can be used to shelter future income notwithstanding a change of 
ownership, the tax laws improve the economic position of bankrupt 
companies relative to similarly situated nonbankrupt companies.184  These 
rules reflect a departure from the otherwise applicable compliance and 
enforcement provisions described in the previous section and lead to 
forgone governmental revenues:  in this case, the taxes that would have 
been due on the future income sheltered by the losses.185  But these 
provisions go far beyond the typical tax expenditure provision,186 as the 
value enhancements they deliver do not merely take the form of a reduced 
overall tax liability.  By easing transfer restrictions, they enable one of the 
bankruptcy estate’s most sizable assets to function less like a legal 
entitlement and more like an item of property.  This metamorphosis is more 
than a mere mincing of legal terms; by allowing tax attributes in effect to be 
transferred to the corporation’s new owners (such as a select group of 
 
 180. The 50 percent threshold must be satisfied by “old and cold” holdings, meaning that 
relevant stakeholders have kept their interests for at least eighteen months. See I.R.C. 
§ 382(l)(5)(E)(i). 
 181. However, recall that NOLs (and certain other valuable tax attributes) are subject to 
reduction in an amount equal to any cancellation of indebtedness income excluded by the 
debtor from taxable income. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.  The reduction is 
made after calculating the tax for the year in which the cancellation of indebtedness occurs. 
I.R.C. § 382(l)(5)(B).  Additionally, NOLs must be reduced for certain interest payments 
made within the past three years to creditors that receive equity interests in the debtor under 
the Chapter 11 plan. Id.  Finally, if an “ownership change” occurs in the two years following 
the debtor’s emergence from bankruptcy, the NOLs must be reduced to zero. See id. 
§ 382(l)(5)(D). 
 182. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 183. See I.R.C. § 382(l)(5)(D). 
 184. Strategic planning opportunities are described by Mark Gelfeld & Karen Lobl, Tax 
Planning Opportunities for Debtor Corporations in Title 11 Proceedings, 91 COM. L.J. 417, 
429 (1986). 
 185. Rules that allow taxpayers to retain valuable tax attributes, such as NOLs, have been 
characterized as tax incentives elsewhere.  For example, the Joint Committee on Taxation 
notes that any extensions in the time limits for carrybacks and carryforwards constitute tax 
expenditures. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 97, at 3; see also Ramseyer & 
Rasmusen, supra note 174, at 8–9 (using the term “tax breaks” to describe the government’s 
issuance of notices exempting the § 363 sale of General Motors from § 382 restrictions); 
Julie Tennyson, Tax Incentives for the Biotechnology Industry:  Should Tennessee Offer 
Sales Tax Exemptions and Net Operating Loss Extensions?, 70 TENN. L. REV. 567, 578 
(2003) (analyzing extensions in the time limits for NOL carryovers as tax expenditures). 
 186. See supra note 96. 
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former creditors and/or shareholders), the tax laws allow these assets to be 
monetized by corporate stakeholders in a way that makes Chapter 11 
bankruptcy especially appealing. 
C.  Discussion:  Valuable Tax Attributes As 
Property of the Bankruptcy Estate 
As the previous sections articulate, modern accounting principles 
recognize valuable tax attributes as “assets,”187 while at the same time 
imposing valuation rules that have the practical effect of obscuring them on 
a bankrupt company’s financial statements.  Meanwhile, an intricate web of 
compliance and enforcement provisions of the Tax Code normally ensures 
that tax attributes function more like revocable, nontransferable legal 
entitlements and less like private property.  However, these special 
provisions ease the restrictions for debtors in Chapter 11 cases.  In doing so, 
the tax laws allow the debtor’s valuable tax attributes to become marketable 
property for a certain subgroup of privileged stakeholders.188 
This property view of tax attributes clearly manifests in bankruptcy law, 
where judges regularly treat certain valuable tax attributes—such as NOLs 
and tax credit carryovers—as property interests of the bankruptcy estate for 
certain purposes.  For instance, bankruptcy judges take proactive measures 
to protect valuable tax attributes for the benefit of the estate.189  To this end, 
courts routinely bar any action by shareholders that has the potential to 
adversely affect the debtor’s future ability to use its valuable tax 
attributes.190  In a 1991 decision, the Second Circuit held that a debtor’s 
sole shareholder’s taking of a worthless stock deduction violated the 
automatic stay to the extent it would eliminate the value of NOLs by 
triggering a change of ownership under the tax laws.191  Acknowledging the 
contingent nature of these assets, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio explained, “What is certain is that the NOL has a 
potential value, as yet undetermined, which will be of benefit to creditors 
and will assist Debtors in their reorganization process.”192  Reflecting this 
view, many bankruptcy courts enjoin, as a matter of course, stock trading 
by significant shareholders during the pendency of the case.193 
 
 187. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 188. The notion that the tax laws can cause tax attributes to function as marketable 
property is explored in Simmons, supra note 157, at 1057–58. 
 189. See infra notes 191–93 and accompanying text. 
 190. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 193. 
 191. In re Prudential Lines Inc., 928 F.2d 565, 573–74 (2d Cir. 1991).  If a change of 
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Of course, this judicial treatment of tax attributes is consistent with 
Congress’s intention to “bring anything of value that the debtors have into 
the estate.”194  In the words of the influential U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of New York, “It is beyond peradventure that NOL 
carrybacks and carryovers are property of the estate of the loss corporation 
that generated them.”195  The Eighth Circuit advanced a similar view of tax 
attributes, noting that the “right to carry forward the [debtor’s] NOLs” 
constituted a “property interest” of the estate.196 
To be sure, these fairly routine declarations that valuable tax attributes 
are property of the estate bring us back full circle.  Against this backdrop, it 
is difficult to find any legal support for the routine omission of a debtor’s 
valuable tax attributes from preliminary asset disclosures.  But the problem 
of inconsistent legal treatment of valuable tax attributes extends much 
further.  As the following sections explain, the debtor’s tax attributes are 
also not consistently taken into consideration as a source of value that can 
be distributed to creditors under a Chapter 11 plan.  This oversight derives 
from an ambiguity at the junction of tax and bankruptcy law. 
II.  THE LOOPHOLE 
As Part I describes, the Tax Code contains numerous bankruptcy-specific 
provisions designed to facilitate resolutions of corporate financial distress 
via Chapter 11 bankruptcy.197  Most notably, the tax laws allow bankrupt 
companies to preserve valuable tax attributes for future use without 
limitation, even where a change of ownership has taken place.198  By easing 
indirect transfer restrictions on a valuable asset, this latter tax provision 
effectively transforms a legal entitlement into marketable property.  Of 
course, while the tax laws allow indirect transfers of the debtor’s valuable 
tax attributes, these transfers must take place pursuant to a confirmed 
Chapter 11 plan and are therefore—at least theoretically—subject to 
bankruptcy law’s broader limitations on transfers of the debtor’s wealth.  In 
 
estate and that substantial equity trades would violate the automatic stay); Revised Final 
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other words, while the tax laws may function to bolster the value of the 
bankruptcy estate, it ought to be squarely within the domain of bankruptcy 
law to account for and distribute this value to satisfy claims against the 
estate.  The very purpose of bankruptcy is to provide for the fair and orderly 
distribution of the debtor’s property in accordance with established legal 
and equitable principles.199 
An expectation that bankruptcy law provides a distributional framework 
may explain why legal scholars were not troubled by the initial adoption of 
the tax laws that allow debtors to indirectly transfer valuable tax attributes 
through Chapter 11.200  Scholars, much like the judges tasked with 
construing these provisions, largely assumed that Chapter 11 would 
function to efficiently and fairly reallocate the value of these newly 
monetized assets to the company’s true residual owners.201  Reflecting this 
view, Professor Michelle Arnopol Cecil noted in a 1992 article that the 
bankruptcy-specific rules on transferability of tax attributes rest upon the 
“sound assumption that historic creditors of a loss corporation are its true 
owners and should be treated as equity holders for tax purposes.”202  
According to Professor Arnopol, this would “effectuat[e] the policy of tax 
neutrality by allowing only the owners of the loss corporation to have 
unfettered use of its net operating losses.”203 
Of course, implicit within this reasoning is an expectation that 
Chapter 11 in fact functions to allow the true residual owners of a 
corporation to succeed to its remaining assets, including its valuable tax 
attributes.  In other words, the argument rests upon an assumption that tax 
attributes, like all other potential sources of value, are accounted for in 
bankruptcy.  Further, the logic assumes that any indirect transfers of 
valuable tax attributes that take place pursuant to a confirmed Chapter 11 
plan merely vest the future economic benefits in the persons who have 
borne the corresponding economic losses, such that they would be entitled 
to distributions from the debtor’s estate in the first place.  But, as we shall 
see, this reasoning assumes too much about the manner in which valuable 
tax attributes are disclosed, appraised, accounted for, and indirectly 
transferred in Chapter 11. 
 
 199. See, e.g., Rine & Rine Auctioneers, Inc. v. Douglas Cnty. Bank & Trust Co. (In re 
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 202. Arnopol, supra note 157, at 195. 
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A.  How Valuable Tax Attributes Escape 
Bankruptcy’s Distributional Norms 
A central claim of this Article is that the debtor’s valuable tax attributes 
function as marketable property and escape Chapter 11’s distributional 
norms.  To be sure, it would violate fundamental principles of tax law to 
distribute a corporate debtor’s tax attributes directly to parties in 
bankruptcy.204  But because the tax laws allow indirect transfers of the 
debtor’s tax attributes in Chapter 11,205 they essentially permit these 
valuable assets to be beneficially distributed to parties in bankruptcy via the 
debtor’s equity security interests.  Moreover, even where the tax attributes 
are not indirectly transferred in Chapter 11 plans pursuant to bankruptcy-
specific tax laws, they are nonetheless distributed by the bankruptcy court 
to the extent their economic benefits are permitted to remain with 
shareholders notwithstanding the impairment of creditor claims.206  Parties 
who receive or retain valuable tax attributes may then use them to shelter 
income from unrelated assets and increase after-tax investment returns. 
Chapter 11 debtors and their stakeholders routinely engage in the indirect 
transfer of valuable tax attributes through changes of ownership in the 
reorganized company.  For instance, some Chapter 11 plans contemplate 
that the debtor’s historic creditors will succeed to the equity interests of the 
reorganized company.  In the recent Chapter 11 case of In re PMI Group, 
Inc., the debtor’s equity security interests were cancelled and new common 
stock was issued to creditors in exchange for their debt claims; this 
arrangement allowed creditors to enjoy the benefit of approximately $1.2 
billion of NOLs.207  At least on the surface, these restructurings seem to 
come the closest to vesting the future economic benefits of tax attributes in 
the parties who have borne the economic burdens of the underlying losses, 
as the indirect transfer of the tax assets at least seems to follow the absolute 
priority rule. 
However, there are other instances where a Chapter 11 plan contemplates 
that shareholders will receive equity interests of the reorganized debtor even 
though creditors will receive minimal or no distributions.  Indeed, as noted 
above, Solyndra’s historic shareholders retained their equity interests under 
the Solyndra Plan,208 effectively stepping ahead of creditors who received 
 
 204. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.  Judge Posner notes this 
impossibility in In re South Beach Securities, Inc., 606 F.3d at 376. 
 205. See supra Part I.B.4. 
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B.R. 586, 614 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (allocating 50 percent or more of the stock of the 
reorganized company to asbestos claimants, as creditors of the debtor). 
 208. In this way, Solyndra’s plan did not turn on application of I.R.C. § 382(l)(5), as any 
changes in equity ownership pursuant to the warrants would take place outside of the 
Chapter 11 plan. See generally Amy S. Elliott, Setting the Record Straight on Solyndra’s 
NOLs Post-bankruptcy, 136 TAX NOTES 1493 (2012). 
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only three cents on the dollar for their claims.209  Solyndra’s shareholders 
relied upon a limited, judicially created210 exception to the absolute priority 
rule where shareholders are permitted to invest new capital in the 
reorganized debtor in exchange for the right to retain their equity security 
interests, even though creditors are not paid in full.211  To meet this “new 
value exception,” investors must contribute new and substantial money or 
money’s worth that is necessary for a successful reorganization and is 
reasonably equivalent to the interest received.212  Finally, creditors must 
either have a right to bid for the equity interests or the bankruptcy court 
must determine the market value of the new equity interests.213  In the 
Solyndra case, the court found that an $810,000 capital contribution,214 
coupled with a commitment to make secured financing available to the 
reorganized debtor,215 was sufficient to allow shareholders to retain their 
equity security interests, thereby preserving their rights to nearly $1 billion 
of the company’s tax attributes.  As these numbers suggest, restructurings 
of this sort pose a more obvious threat to the absolute priority rule. 
But both types of restructurings have the potential to yield inequitable 
and inefficient allocations of value.  This is because, astonishingly, whether 
the Chapter 11 plan vests beneficial ownership of a debtor’s valuable tax 
attributes in creditors or shareholders, bankruptcy’s most vital safeguards 
do not apply to the transfer.  Indeed, the law fails to provide an efficient 
mechanism for both recognizing the value enhancements that these tax 
attributes bring to the debtor’s corporate stock and ensuring that such value 
is subjected to Chapter 11’s distributional norms. 
The disconnect is caused by an ambiguity at the junction of tax and 
bankruptcy law.  Recall that under bankruptcy law, a court must confirm a 
Chapter 11 plan before a debtor can exit bankruptcy.216  Where there is 
controversy, such as where the debtor is attempting to obtain judicial 
confirmation over the objections of dissenting impaired classes, the court 
must ensure that the plan is “fair and equitable.”217  As noted above, this 
analysis requires, in pertinent part, that the court evaluate whether the plan 
provides each impaired and dissenting creditor with at least as much as it 
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12799 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 7, 2012). 
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would have received in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.218  But this 
analytical device is defective.  Testing the Chapter 11 plan against a 
hypothetical liquidation naturally omits the debtor’s valuable tax attributes 
from consideration, as they would be extinguished when the liquidated 
debtor is subsequently dissolved.219  In effect, this means that the “fair and 
equitable” analysis ignores the presence of what may be the debtor’s most 
valuable asset.220  For instance, disclosures accompanying the Solyndra 
Plan explained that the “[d]ebtor may have various other miscellaneous 
assets, including net operating loss carry-forwards and/or rights to tax 
refunds.  No value has been ascribed to such other miscellaneous assets for 
purposes hereof.”221  Considering the substantial value placed on these tax 
assets, how can bankruptcy law’s most important safeguard allow these 
assets to be relegated to an excluded, miscellaneous category?  Indeed, the 
very asset that motivated Solyndra’s restructuring was a mere footnote in 
the “fair and equitable” analysis used to test compliance with the absolute 
priority rule.222 
In practice, this astonishing gap in the law means that impaired 
dissenting classes must rely on their relative bargaining power in private 
negotiations, without the benefit of statutory safeguards, to determine 
whether and how valuable tax attributes will be allocated.  Disgruntled 
claimants who appreciate the magnitude of the debtor’s tax attributes but 
are either unable to gain a seat at the negotiation table,223 or who wrestle 
their way into the negotiations but lack the power to bargain for better 
treatment, are left with only one recourse:  they must challenge the plan’s 
estimation of the debtor’s enterprise value.224  In challenges of this sort, 
claimants essentially plead with the court to bring tax attributes within 
bankruptcy’s distributional norms by demonstrating that certain classes of 
creditors or equity holders will receive or retain value under the plan in 
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violation of the absolute priority rule, in the form of equity security interests 
in the debtor that either exceed the value of the holders’ claims, or that 
exceed the value of any new money they intend to contribute to the 
reorganized debtor. 
But these disputes are extremely costly and time consuming, often 
requiring expert testimony to consider how various tax attributes should be 
appraised under complex financial valuation models.225  And even the most 
comprehensive valuation models are ultimately based on multiple 
assumptions and subjective determinations.226  For instance, in the highly 
contested In re Washington Mutual, Inc. case, the consolidated debtors’ 
expert applied a financial model that declined to take into consideration the 
likelihood that the reorganized company would receive new capital or debt 
infusions to acquire profitable businesses; accordingly, the plan’s estimated 
reorganization value was quite conservative.227  Meanwhile, the expert for 
the plan’s opponents speculated that the reorganized debtor could raise 
billions of dollars to realize more of the tax benefits.228  The court 
ultimately adopted a conservative valuation estimate, noting that “the 
Reorganized Debtor should be able to raise additional capital and debt over 
the next twenty years equal to twice the value of its current assets,”229 
which the court found to be approximately $140 million.230  Within months 
of exiting bankruptcy, the reorganized debtor had already executed debt 
instruments allowing it to borrow over $250 million to acquire profitable 
businesses and utilize the tax benefits, thereby rapidly outpacing the court’s 
ballpark figure.231 
Thus, while challenges to the debtor’s reorganization value may provide 
a last resort for impaired dissenting classes, they do not offer meaningful 
safeguards.  Moreover, much has changed in the decades following the 
initial adoption of Chapter 11 in 1978 and the revamping of the Tax Code 
in 1986.232  As I have argued elsewhere, modern corporate restructurings 
are highly political processes, in which insiders, traditional bank lenders, 
hedge funds, distressed-debt investors, and other powerful stakeholders are 
able to engage in strategic conduct to acquire control of the process.233  In 
this environment, Chapter 11 enables parties with existing market power in 
the securities and capital markets to extract excess returns at the expense of 
other constituents.234  Negotiations often focus on the distribution of 
economic burdens, on one hand, and the exploitation of rent-seeking 
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opportunities, on the other.235  As the following section explores, some 
constituents are placed at a considerable disadvantage early in the process, 
where they must find the resources to overcome costly barriers to entry and 
significant collective action obstacles.  Because bankruptcy law fails to 
appraise and account adequately for the debtor’s valuable tax attributes, the 
tax attributes have become a principal source of excess returns in this 
deeply flawed process. 
B.  Chapter 11 As an Anticompetitive Environment for Negotiating 
Allocations of Valuable Tax Attributes 
Theoretically, allocations of a bankrupt company’s wealth are 
determined—or at least severely constrained—by the Bankruptcy Code.  
But for the reasons discussed in previous sections, the debtor’s valuable tax 
attributes largely escape these constraints, leaving it to the parties to 
negotiate to receive the future benefits of the debtor’s valuable tax 
attributes.  What is more, Chapter 11 constructs an anticompetitive 
environment for these negotiations.  For example, the omission of tax 
attributes from a debtor’s preliminary asset disclosures leads to information 
asymmetries as to the nature and extent of what may be the debtor’s most 
sizable asset.  Additionally, not only does bankruptcy law fail to remedy the 
market failure, it also buttresses it through legal rules that impose barriers to 
entry and that effectively entrench the market power of certain parties, such 
as insiders, dominant lenders, hedge funds, and other institutional investors.  
Finally, principal-agent problems arise as these dominant stakeholders with 
superior information and market power use their negotiating positions to 
steer the case towards an outcome that allows them to extract the tax 
benefits to privilege future, unrelated investments.  Each of these problems 
is considered in greater detail below. 
First, the lack of adequate disclosure of valuable tax attributes early in 
the bankruptcy case causes an information asymmetry.236  This asymmetry 
rewards sophisticated stakeholders at the expense of other constituents and 
allows them to negotiate with more or better information as to the true value 
of the bankrupt company.237  Further, in light of the debtor’s exclusive right 
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to file a Chapter 11 plan during the first 120 days,238 those stakeholders 
who are in the best position to know the nature and extent of the debtor’s 
tax attributes are also most likely to be tasked with preparation and 
advancement of the debtor’s Chapter 11 plan.  The resultant power 
imbalance infects the restructuring with strategic, rather than transparent 
and competitive, bargaining.  And, ironically, because Chapter 11 relies on 
consensus- and market-based processes to reach case outcomes,239 these 
information asymmetries have the potential to thwart the efficient resolution 
of corporate financial distress. 
This ambiguity in the law also manifests in a more subtle—yet equally 
troublesome—way:  it weakens the negotiating power of certain parties 
from the outset of the case by obscuring the true enterprise value of the 
debtor.  For instance, the debtor’s failure to disclose the nature and extent of 
its valuable tax attributes early in the case can prevent common 
shareholders from gaining a seat at the negotiation table.  The U.S. 
Trustee’s power to appoint an official committee to represent equity 
security holders is discretionary, rather than mandatory, and the U.S. 
Trustee will only appoint a committee where shareholders prove that they 
are not already adequately represented.240  Courts reiterate that the 
appointment of an equity committee is extraordinary relief, and their 
formation “should be the rare exception.”241  Under the strictest standard, 
shareholders bear the burden of demonstrating “a substantial likelihood that 
they will receive a meaningful distribution in the case under a strict 
application of the absolute priority rule.”242 
Without early and meaningful disclosure of the debtor’s assets, including 
its tax attributes, shareholders cannot meet this burden.  In that event, the 
U.S. Trustee is likely to determine that the equity security holders have no 
reasonable expectation of a recovery and thus do not require the 
appointment of an equity committee.243  For precisely these reasons, 
shareholders in the recent In re Eastman Kodak Co. bankruptcy case had to 
“take matters into their own hands . . . [and were] forced to represent 
[themselves].”244  This creates both a substantial barrier to entry and a 
collective action obstacle in Chapter 11 negotiations.245 
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Along similar lines, the market for the debtor’s tax benefits is further 
insulated from competition by legal barriers, such as the exclusivity rule,246 
as well as strategic barriers, such as Chapter 11–plan proponents’ frequent 
and deliberate creation of impaired classes to vote in favor of a 
controversial plan.247  Indeed, the enormous transaction costs associated 
with a plan-confirmation battle also serve as a legal barrier of sorts, 
particularly where only certain parties enjoy reimbursement of attorney’s 
fees from the debtor’s estate.248 
These inefficiencies, in turn, lead to principal-agent problems.  
Chapter 11 relies on formal and informal grouping mechanisms, whereby 
persons designated as agents represent an aggregated grouping of similarly 
situated claimants.  For instance, in a Chapter 11 case, similarly situated 
claimants may be recognized collectively in official committees comprising 
persons holding the largest claims.249  Yet within these agency structures, 
certain dominant stakeholders with superior information, as well as market 
power in the capital and securities markets, such as insiders, traditional 
bank lenders, hedge funds, and distressed debt investors, are able to lobby 
the agent to steer the case towards an outcome that allows them to extract 
excess returns.250  For instance, in the Solyndra case, dominant 
shareholders arguably took control of the case long before the company 
filed for bankruptcy by advancing the February 2011 restructuring and 
securing warrants to obtain additional equity in the debtor.251  These same 
dominant shareholders also served as proponents of the company’s Chapter 
11 plan, advancing a plan that would enable them to use the tax attributes to 
privilege their future, unrelated investments.252 
For these reasons, Chapter 11 creates an anticompetitive environment, in 
which the debtor’s valuable tax attributes become economic rents for 
dominant stakeholders.  In this manner, the muddled overlap of tax and 
bankruptcy law facilitates a bewildering result.  Valuable tax attributes, 
which are routinely recognized by bankruptcy courts as “property” of the 
estate253 and are often a debtor’s most substantial asset, are permitted to 
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group members’ holdings to obtain a greater degree of influence in a bankruptcy case than 
single creditors acting alone.”). 
 250. See Dick, supra note 22, at 816.  The concerns I raise in my previous work to some 
extent echo early criticisms of Chapter 11’s predecessor law. See generally SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, 
PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1937). 
 251. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra Part I.C. 
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disappear down the proverbial rabbit hole, sidestepping bankruptcy’s vital 
safeguards and falling to the mercy of monopolized negotiations, where 
they can be exploited as excess returns. 
To be sure, valuable tax attributes are not the only assets that meet this 
fate.  Other intangible assets, such as goodwill, intellectual property, and 
litigation claims arguably meet a similar fate and thus present the same 
challenges to bankruptcy practice.  But the case of valuable tax attributes 
has especially profound legal implications, as it also calls into question the 
historical justifications for generous tax laws that facilitate Chapter 11 
restructurings.254  If the goal of tax law, to the extent it intersects with 
bankruptcy law, is to enable economically efficient restructurings of 
business enterprises, then the tax consequences of the choice to pursue 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy ought to be neutral.  But the ability to extract 
valuable tax attributes for future use substantially changes the incentive 
effects of the corporate income tax on financially distressed companies and 
their stakeholders.  In this way, the law motivates stakeholders of distressed 
companies to engage in lengthy and expensive Chapter 11 cases255 and to 
pursue acquisitive investments that they would not otherwise pursue 
following emergence from bankruptcy.  Meanwhile, the taxpayers 
essentially subsidize, via the Tax Code, unnecessary and economically 
inefficient reorganizations that reward dominant stakeholders.256  The 
following section considers various reform proposals to improve the overall 
efficiency and fairness of commercial bankruptcies under Chapter 11. 
III.  CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE 
This Article has shown how an ambiguity at the intersection of the 
corporate tax laws and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code enables certain 
of a corporate debtor’s most valuable assets to escape bankruptcy’s 
distributional norms and serve as excess returns to dominant parties.  The 
resulting inefficiencies implicate the fields of corporate taxation and 
commercial bankruptcy.  Thus, to address the issues identified in this 
Article, policymakers must target reform efforts in three major policy areas:  
(1) reforming the bankruptcy laws to ensure that value created by the tax 
laws is adequately disclosed and fairly distributed in the course of a 
restructuring; (2) reforming the tax laws to prevent corporate debtors from 
receiving the benefit of specialized tax provisions unless they are actually 
reorganizing the business enterprise in substance rather than merely in 
form; and (3) redesigning the overlap of the tax and bankruptcy laws to 
 
 254. See, e.g., Arnopol, supra note 157. 
 255. Solyndra’s decision to conduct its liquidation via bankruptcy process carried a 
substantial investment of time and resources:  the company spent nearly fourteen months in 
Chapter 11, incurring costs of nearly $8 million for professional advisors alone. See 
Certification of Counsel with Respect to Proposed Omnibus Order Approving Final Fee 
Applications of Professionals at Exhibit A, In re Solyndra, No. 11-12799 (MFW) (D. Del. 
Dec. 26, 2012). 
 256. See supra Part II. 
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ensure greater coordination and fewer opportunities for abuse.  Each of 
these goals is discussed in greater detail below. 
A.  Revisions to the Bankruptcy Laws 
Two principal reforms are needed to the bankruptcy laws:  first, 
bankruptcy disclosure rules should be amended to require disclosure of a 
debtor’s valuable tax attributes as assets early in the case; second, 
Chapter 11 must affirmatively bring the debtor’s valuable tax attributes 
under bankruptcy’s distributional norms.  Each of these specific reforms is 
explained in the following subsections. 
1.  Modifications to Bankruptcy Disclosure Rules 
As a preliminary matter, bankruptcy disclosure rules should be modified 
to require early and meaningful disclosure of a debtor’s valuable tax 
attributes as assets.  While bankruptcy law requires that a plan proponent 
disclose the material tax consequences of the reorganization,257 these 
disclosures come much later in the Chapter 11 case, when the collateral 
consequences of inadequate asset disclosures have already taken place.  
Early and meaningful disclosure can be facilitated by expressly including 
the debtor’s valuable tax attributes as a separate category of the currently 
required “Schedule B—Personal Property” of the debtor’s asset disclosure 
schedules.258  Alternatively, a new “Schedule K—Tax Attributes” can be 
created, with space for the debtor to list and describe its various tax 
attributes.  Instructions accompanying the relevant form would require that, 
for disclosure purposes, the debtor must identify the face value of tax 
attributes rather than their carrying value as determined under GAAP.259 
To be sure, richer asset disclosures promote the goals of bankruptcy and 
better protect the interests of creditors.  What is more, an amendment of this 
sort reflects the principled approach adopted by the Delaware Court of 
Chancery in a 2010 corporate decision, which appreciates the economic 
significance of tax attributes even where they suffer full impairment under 
the accounting rules.  In Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enterprises, Inc.,260 the 
court approved a corporation’s use of penalty provisions in stockholder 
rights plans to deter transactions that might jeopardize the corporation’s 
future ability to use its NOLs.261  In deciding that this NOL “poison pill”262 
was a valid exercise of the corporate board’s authority, the court concluded 
 
 257. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012). 
 258. See B 6B (Official Form 6B), supra note 132. 
 259. The differences are described supra Part I.B.1. 
 260. No. 4241-VCN, 2010 WL 703062 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2010). 
 261. Id. at *25. 
 262. The typical poison pill dilutes any stockholder who acquires shares in excess of a 
specified ownership threshold without prior board approval.  For a more detailed discussion 
of poison pills specifically designed to protect a firm’s NOLs, see Merle Erickson & Shane 
Heitzman, NOL Poison Pills:  Selectica v. Versata, 127 TAX NOTES 1369 (2010); Peter B. 
Siegal, Using Appraisal To Protect Net Operating Loss Carryforwards, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
927, 929–30 (2012). 
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that NOLs were a “company asset worth protecting.”263  Responding to a 
claim that the NOLs did not constitute an asset because any value they had 
was highly contingent and subject to legal restrictions on their use, the court 
took great pains to separate the question of whether the NOLs were an asset 
from the calculation of their value under GAAP.264  To this end, it rejected 
the argument that the company’s decision to take a full valuation allowance 
for the NOLs in its recent financial statements suggested that they were not 
assets worth protecting.265  Notwithstanding the accounting write-down, the 
NOLs were subjectively valued by the firm’s stakeholders and had been 
assigned substantial economic value by the company’s professional 
advisors.266 
Applying the Selectica court’s reasoning to bankruptcy law’s asset 
disclosure requirements, it seems that debtors ought to disclose fully tax 
attributes as potentially valuable assets at the outset of the bankruptcy case, 
regardless of their valuation as determined under GAAP.267  Of course, 
while enhanced asset disclosures would reduce information asymmetries, 
additional legal reforms are needed to bring valuable tax attributes within 
bankruptcy’s distributional norms.  The following section considers a 
proposal to achieve this end. 
2.  Amendments to the Chapter 11 Plan Confirmation Tests 
This Article has demonstrated how valuable tax attributes can be 
monetized and transferred through Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Yet this 
allocation process largely escapes bankruptcy’s distributional norms, 
occurring entirely via private negotiations that tend to be monopolized by 
dominant parties, such as insiders, hedge funds, and other powerful 
distressed-debt investors. 
Thus, Chapter 11’s safeguards should take into account the debtor’s 
valuable tax attributes.  To this end, the rules governing judicial 
confirmation of nonconsensual Chapter 11 plans should be modified.  
Courts may continue to evaluate the fairness of nonconsensual plans against 
a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation; however, the statutory test268 should 
be amended to expressly take into account the net present value of the 
debtor’s available tax attributes.  The net present value calculation would 
assume (1) that all available valuable tax attributes will be utilized pro rata 
over a period not to exceed five years following the debtor’s reemergence 
from bankruptcy, and (2) in each such tax year, the debtor will be subject to 
the highest federal income tax bracket ever applied to the debtor and which 
 
 263. Selectica, 2010 WL 703062, at *17. 
 264. Id. at *19. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at *19 n.161. 
 267. Arguably, to the extent companies are able to steer the Chapter 11 case to an 
outcome that preserves and maximizes valuable tax attributes for future use, companies 
should no longer take a full valuation allowance once they have entered Chapter 11 
bankruptcy. 
 268. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2012). 
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is then in effect.269  Tax attributes would be valued as of the effective date 
of the plan, taking into account the time-value of money and any reductions 
mandated by the tax laws, such as the reduction for cancellation of 
indebtedness income excluded by the debtor from taxable income.270  That 
amount would be added to the total liquidation value as an additional, 
hypothetical, cash-equivalent asset.  Then, with respect to each impaired 
class of claims or interests, each holder would receive under the proposed 
plan property equal to or greater than the amount that such holder would 
receive if the debtor company were liquidated under Chapter 7 and the 
debtor’s assets, including the hypothetical cash-equivalent asset, were 
distributed to all claimants.271 
Of course, in many cases this calculation will be ill suited to the actual 
economic circumstances confronting the debtor.  In situations of this sort, 
the court would set an evidentiary hearing to determine the value of the 
debtor’s tax attributes.  The debtor would bear the initial burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence272 that its tax attributes are worth less 
than the amount determined under the net present value calculation 
described above.  Likewise, impaired classes of claimants would bear the 
initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
debtor’s valuable tax attributes are worth more than the amount determined 
under the net present value calculation.  In either case, opponents would be 
required to prove the value of tax attributes using a discounted cash flows 
analysis.273  In these proceedings, the court would not be bound by the 
conclusions reached by expert witnesses and may make adjustments to 
arrive at a final judgment on the value of the debtor’s tax attributes. 
By forcing the Chapter 11 plan to take into account the value of the 
debtor’s tax attributes to those persons who hold equity security interests in 
the debtor at the time it exits bankruptcy, this rule would make valuable tax 
attributes a neutral factor in Chapter 11 restructurings.  At the same time, it 
 
 269. This framework assumes that the reorganized debtor will take steps to maximize its 
economic interests vis-à-vis the valuable tax attributes.  This assumption is consistent with 
broader corporate jurisprudence. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588–89 (1986) (assuming that firms behave in an economically rational 
manner). 
 270. See supra notes 111, 181 and accompanying text. 
 271. The proposed modification would be made to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7). 
 272. The Supreme Court has explained that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard 
is appropriate for deciding most bankruptcy claims. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 
(1991) (“Because the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard results in a roughly equal 
allocation of the risk of error between litigants, we presume that this standard is applicable in 
civil actions between private litigants unless ‘particularly important individual interests or 
rights are at stake.’” (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389–90 
(1983))). 
 273. A discounted cash flows analysis would estimate the tax attributes’ value by using 
forecasted future cash flows, and by applying an appropriate discount rate. See DAVID T. 
LARABEE & JASON A. VOSS, VALUATION TECHNIQUES:  DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW, EARNINGS 
EQUALITY, MEASURES OF VALUE ADDED, AND REAL OPTIONS 108 (2013).  Factors that would 
be relevant to the forecast include:  (1) proposed or otherwise anticipated changes to the 
reorganized company’s business enterprise, (2) forecasted revenue growth rates for such 
industry, and (3) estimated future expenses. Id. 
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would further advance the congressional intent to prevent the use of the 
bankruptcy process to traffic in corporate shells.274 
B.  Revisions to the Tax Laws 
As a preliminary matter, the Tax Code should be amended to prevent 
corporate debtors from receiving the benefit of tax provisions that are 
designed to facilitate Chapter 11 restructurings unless they are actually 
reorganizing the business enterprise in substance rather than merely in 
form.  Considering how these provisions are utilized in modern Chapter 11 
proceedings, they essentially function as unintended tax expenditures to 
benefit dominant corporate stakeholders.  Imposing additional limitations 
on these provisions would also bring them into greater harmony with sound 
tax policy and the economic realities of a particular transaction.275 
Most importantly, the bankruptcy-specific tax law that allows debtors to 
preserve their valuable tax attributes, notwithstanding a change of 
ownership,276 should be amended to apply only to Chapter 11 plans that 
satisfy the more stringent business continuity requirements.277  The analysis 
would emphasize economic substance over legal form, taking into account 
the historic business that generated the tax attributes rather than the historic 
business of a mere holding company or other corporate entity presently 
possessing the tax attributes. 
Amendments of this sort would allow the Tax Code’s bankruptcy-
specific provisions to more narrowly target troubled businesses that utilize 
Chapter 11 to rehabilitate and restructure in a way that preserves jobs and 
continues a productive business enterprise.  At the same time, they would 
prevent the use of the bankruptcy process to cleanse a company of its 
unsecured debts and underperforming assets and restructure it as an 
investment vehicle with built-in, taxpayer-subsidized investment returns.  In 
doing so, these amendments would help take valuable tax attributes from 
the position of being a driving force in Chapter 11 cases and relegate them 
to playing the incidental role that Congress envisioned.278  Further, these 
modifications would drive home the point that when companies pursue 
bankruptcy protection, they necessarily submit all of their assets to the 
court’s jurisdiction, including their tax assets. 
To this end, as an alternative to the revision I proposed above to 
bankruptcy’s “best interest of the creditor’s test,”279 the tax laws could also 
be modified to prevent stakeholders from using valuable tax attributes as a 
source of excess returns in bankruptcy.  For example, Congress could 
clarify that, so long as historic shareholders and creditors receive at least 50 
percent of the reorganized debtor’s equity security interests, the debtor may 
retain only a share of its available tax attributes, calculated by applying the 
 
 274. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 275. See infra notes 283–89 and accompanying text. 
 276. See I.R.C. § 382(l)(5) (2012). 
 277. These requirements are set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(4)(ii) (2011). 
 278. See supra note 45. 
 279. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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ratio of (i) the allowable claims, as determined under bankruptcy law,280 of 
the historic shareholders and creditors that are deemed to be fully satisfied, 
because such persons will have received equity security interests in the 
reorganized debtor, to (ii) the total of all allowable claims against the 
debtor.281  The amount of available tax attributes would take into account 
any reductions mandated by the tax laws, such as the reduction for 
cancellation of indebtedness income excluded by the debtor from taxable 
income.282  For example, if a company with $1,000 of NOLs reorganizes 
pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan that vests 100 percent of the reorganized 
debtor’s equity security interests in historic creditors who together hold 
only 75 percent of the total allowable claims against the debtor, then the 
available NOLs would be reduced to $750. 
A rule of this sort takes into consideration the theoretical argument that 
creditors of an insolvent corporation are its true owners; however, it only 
allows such owners to receive their pro rata share of the tax benefits.  Of 
course, from a tax policy perspective, this revision may not be sufficient to 
prevent tax-motivated Chapter 11 reorganizations.  Dominant stakeholders 
would still have the ability to extract a large share of valuable tax attributes 
without regard for the interests of the debtor’s other constituents.  
Accordingly, changes to the bankruptcy laws are still needed to address 
these distributional elements. 
C.  Reassessing the Intersection of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Tax Law 
In addition to the specific reforms noted above, greater attention is 
generally needed at the crossroads where the tax and bankruptcy laws 
intersect.  Modern commercial bankruptcies have grown ever more 
complex; meanwhile, the tax laws have increased in magnitude and 
difficulty.  These trends create ample opportunity for sophisticated 
companies and their advisors to find and exploit ambiguities and 
inadequacies in the law. 
These two intricate areas of law must be assessed to ensure seamless 
overlap.  Presently, federal tax law largely defers to Chapter 11, affording 
valuable tax benefits with minimal restrictions.  The problems identified in 
this Article appear to derive, at least in part, from a false assumption in the 
tax laws that companies in bankruptcy pursue either rehabilitative relief 
under Chapter 11 or liquidation under Chapter 7.  But as corporate 
structures have grown more complex in the years following Chapter 11’s 
initial enactment, and as Chapter 11 is increasingly used to engage in 
liquidations of all or part of a company’s business assets,283 these tax laws 
rest upon an outmoded and incorrect assumption.  Now that Chapter 11 is 
routinely used to liquidate some entities in the corporate structure and 
reorganize others, broad bankruptcy-related exceptions in the tax laws are 
 
 280. See 11 U.S.C. § 502. 
 281. See id. 
 282. See supra notes 111, 181 and accompanying text. 
 283. See, e.g., supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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especially susceptible to abuse.  Rather than relying on loose references to a 
“plan of reorganization,”284 the Tax Code ought to develop its own 
definitions of rehabilitative versus liquidating bankruptcies and invoke 
these definitions in bankruptcy-specific tax laws. 
More broadly, greater coordination is needed between the IRS and the 
U.S. Trustee to combat abuse of Chapter 11 to harvest tax losses and use 
them to shelter income.  For one thing, both agencies can appeal to the 
bankruptcy courts to use their judicial discretion to apply broad anti-abuse 
rules to questionable restructurings.285  Similarly, there are numerous 
judicial doctrines, stretching across both disciplines, that can be used to 
challenge Chapter 11 plans that seek to exploit the debtor’s tax attributes in 
bankruptcy.286  For instance, the doctrine of substance over form is used in 
tax law to force a taxpayer to realize tax consequences in accordance with 
the economic substance of a transaction rather than its legal form.287  
Meanwhile, the same doctrine has been applied in bankruptcy cases to 
determine the true nature of a debtor’s interest in property.288  Similarly, the 
step transaction doctrine assigns legal consequences to an entire integrated 
event rather than a series of separate steps,289 while the sham transaction 
doctrine allows courts to unwind structures intended to avoid income tax 
liability.290  Finally, the business purpose doctrine challenges transactions 
that fail to be motivated by the exigencies of business and are instead 
devices for tax avoidance.291 
These doctrines could have been used to successfully challenge 
Solyndra’s pseudo-reorganization.  However, doing so would have required 
the IRS to look beyond the tax laws and the U.S. Trustee to look beyond the 
bankruptcy laws, such that each would appreciate the broader consequences 
of various steps taken by Solyndra and its stakeholders.  For instance, the 
government could have argued that Solyndra’s purported reorganization 
 
 284. For instance, Treasury Regulation § 1.382-9 refers repeatedly to a “plan of 
reorganization.” See Treas. Reg. § 1.382-9 (as amended in 1994). 
 285. I.R.C. § 269(a)(1). 
 286. Tax doctrines, including “substance over form,” were invoked by Judge Posner in a 
spirited opinion addressing an unsuccessful attempt by South Beach Securities, Inc., to use 
Chapter 11 to preserve valuable tax attributes in an uncontested Chapter 11 case involving 
only insiders as creditors. See In re S. Beach Sec., Inc., 606 F.3d 366, 374 (7th Cir. 2010).  
Tax doctrines were also invoked by the IRS to find that an acquisition of a corporation with 
substantial NOLs did not satisfy the § 382 bankruptcy-specific rules, even though the 
transaction technically met statutory requirements. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200915033 
(Apr. 10, 2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0915033.pdf. 
 287. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469–70 (1935). 
 288. See, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 416 F.3d 609, 614 (7th 
Cir. 2005). 
 289. Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989). 
 290. See, e.g., Cohen v. Comm’r, No. 110869, 1943 WL 9207 (T.C. Aug. 4, 1943).  
Judicial consideration of “corporate shams” was given recent empirical attention in Joshua 
D. Blank & Nancy Staudt, Corporate Shams, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1641, 1659–65 (2012) 
(finding that the courts have produced a consistent body of law to identify abusive corporate 
sham transactions). 
 291. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1978); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.368-1(b) to (c) (2012). 
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was a sham, and that the Chapter 11 plan used the legal form of a 
reorganization to achieve the economic substance of a liquidation.  To this 
end, the step transaction doctrine could have been used to collapse 
Solyndra’s February 2011 adoption of a parent-subsidiary structure and the 
later Chapter 11 plan.  Doing so may have demonstrated that the purported 
business purpose motivating the February 2011 restructuring was 
insufficient to disguise the true tax-driven character of the transaction, that 
the reorganization elements of the Chapter 11 plan lacked economic 
substance, and that the Solyndra Plan in substance contemplated only a 
liquidation of the business and a preservation of the future tax benefits to 
benefit future, unrelated investments.  The U.S. Trustee, in its role as a 
“watchdog in bankruptcy proceedings,”292 should be more proactively 
examining Chapter 11 cases for abuses of this sort, drawing upon 
bankruptcy and tax statutory law, as well as doctrinal principles. 
Of course, sound application of these judicial doctrines to complex 
questions at the confluence of bankruptcy and tax law requires greater 
coordination from the bench.  As modern commercial bankruptcies feature 
increasingly nuanced tax issues, presiding judges must be well versed in the 
tax laws.  Thus, while bankruptcy jurisdiction may continue to reside in the 
bankruptcy judge,293 judges should be required—or at least strongly 
encouraged—to refer cases and proceedings to the U.S. tax court for 
guidance on the tax implications of decisions rendered in the bankruptcy 
case.  Indeed, Congress should reconsider providing U.S. bankruptcy courts 
jurisdiction to resolve tax matters that arise in bankruptcy cases.294  A full 
discussion of the proper jurisdictional balance for tax and bankruptcy 
matters is outside the scope of this Article, but on the surface it seems that 
the traditional efficiency arguments that favor more streamlined case 
management cannot justify failures of the sort identified here. 
Finally, while also beyond the scope of this Article, there is a deeper 
question that deserves thoughtful scholarly attention:  should bankruptcy 
law continue to defer to GAAP as the primary way for parties to disclose 
their economic condition?  Skeptics exist in the legal and accounting 
scholarly communities.295  Although modern accounting principles allow 
for the systematic reporting of assets and liabilities, the rules were designed 
to serve a different purpose and do not necessarily give the truest picture of 
a person’s overall economic condition.  Indeed, just as tax law strays from 
GAAP in computing a corporation’s earnings and profits for the purposes of 
 
 292. In re S. Beach Sec., Inc., 606 F.3d 366, 370 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing the duties 
assigned to the U.S. Trustee under 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3) (2006)); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 586(a)(3)(B) (authorizing the U.S. Trustee to monitor Chapter 11 plans and disclosure 
statements); Morgenstern v. Revco D.S., Inc., 898 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1990) (referring to 
the U.S. Trustee as a “watchdog”). 
 293. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1334. 
 294. Questions of this sort are raised in Steve R. Johnson, The Phoenix and the Perils of 
the Second Best:  Why Heightened Appellate Deference to Tax Court Decisions Is 
Undesirable, 77 OR. L. REV. 235, 239–42 (1998). 
 295. See generally Mark J. Cowan, A GAAP Critic’s Guide to Corporate Income Taxes, 
66 TAX LAW. 209 (2012). 
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identifying taxable distributions to shareholders,296 so should bankruptcy 
law stray from GAAP in computing a debtor’s economic condition.  For 
instance, bankruptcy law might depart from GAAP by providing a method 
for debtors to value tax attributes during the pendency of a Chapter 11 case. 
More broadly, continued diligence and thoughtful attention to the overlap 
of tax law and commercial bankruptcy are needed to maintain a fair, 
efficient, and tax-neutral system for restructuring financially distressed 
firms.  This will require, in part, additional thoughtful exchanges between 
tax and bankruptcy scholars and practitioners.  I hope that this Article, and 
the responses it generates, contribute richly to this enhanced dialogue. 
CONCLUSION 
Between tax law and bankruptcy law lies fertile ground for companies in 
financial distress to design abusive, tax-motivated restructuring 
transactions.  For example, Solyndra’s pseudo-reorganization takes 
advantage of Chapter 11’s historic role as a rehabilitative device to cloak a 
corporate liquidation with some semblance of reorganization and exploit 
valuable tax attributes as excess returns.  When troublesome ambiguities of 
this sort are exploited, taxpayers are left subsidizing economically irrational 
restructurings, while providing built-in investment returns for future, 
unrelated investments.  Because these tax benefits manage to escape 
bankruptcy’s distributional norms, the benefits largely accrue to insiders, 
traditional bank lenders, hedge funds, distressed-debt investors, and other 
powerful stakeholders.  Meanwhile, the distressed company’s other 
constituents—employees, unsecured creditors, or common shareholders, as 
the case may be—bear a disproportionate share of the company’s losses 
without any of the accompanying tax benefits.  Not only is this outcome 
inequitable and inefficient, but it fails to satisfy basic elements of sound tax 
and bankruptcy policy.  Working together to advance meaningful legal 
reforms, tax and bankruptcy experts can eradicate abuses of this sort and 
help to restore the functionality of the commercial restructuring process. 
 
 296. The method of calculating a corporation’s earnings and profits is set forth in 
regulations promulgated under 26 I.R.C. § 312. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6 (2012). 
